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AN ANTITRUST NARCOTIC:
HOW THE RULE OF REASON IS LULLING
VERTICAL ENFORCEMENT TO SLEEP
Nicole McGuire*
Over time, the Supreme Court has adopted a laissez faire attitude
toward antitrust enforcement, which now threatens to end vertical
enforcement altogether. Since the inception of the Sherman Act, the
Court has limited the application of Section 1 to only those contracts
that endorse unreasonable restraints on trade. In doing so, the Court
voiced a preference for using the defendant-friendly rule of reason over
the strict per se standard when determining reasonableness. Then in
2007, the Court took the final step in relaxing vertical enforcement by
mandating that courts evaluate all vertical restraints under the rule of
reason. Regrettably, the rule of reason often amounts to per se
nonliability in practice, thereby frustrating the very objectives that the
Sherman Act was enacted to protect. This Article argues that the Court,
through its leniency toward vertical enforcement and its failure to
provide sufficient guidance about how to apply the rule of reason, has
endorsed per se legality for all vertical restraints. It then proposes that
in order to resume an optimal level of enforcement, the rule of reason
should be replaced by a rebuttable presumption of illegality.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S., Chemical
Engineering, May 2005, University of Florida. My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Daniel
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“Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic
power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy;
that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a
stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is
necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough
alone.” Judge Learned Hand1
I. INTRODUCTION
Promoting competition and implementing a free-market system
are generally accepted in the United States as the best ways to
allocate resources and eliminate economic waste.2 The U.S. Supreme
Court has even gone so far as to say that competition in the free
market “provid[es] an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions.”3 Simultaneously, the
government has always been concerned with too much centralized
economic power, monopolies in particular,4 fearing that efficiency
and consumer welfare are sacrificed when private businesses are
allowed to operate, unregulated, in the free market. 5 To prevent
excessive centralized power, the government has developed
protections in the form of antitrust laws. The primary purpose of U.S.
antitrust laws is to eliminate conduct that could prove detrimental to
competition, consumers, and the free market.6 However, effective
antitrust laws must strike a balance between favoring a competitive,

1. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
2. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[T]he unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress . . . .”); ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE
REGULATION 2 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2010).
3. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4.
4. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 1; see also Christopher S. Kelly, Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: The Final Blow to the Use of the Per Se Rules in Judging
Vertical Restraints—Why the Court Got It Wrong, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 593, 595 (2008) (“By the
late nineteenth century, . . . [i]t was feared that if economic power was concentrated in the hands
of a select few, additional concentration of market power would naturally occur, and would result
in trusts that would use their power to oppress individuals and injure the public.”).
5. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
6. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)) (“The Sherman Act reflects a
legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also
better goods and services. ‘The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the
value of competition.’”).
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free market economy and eliminating the excessive power that such
an economy has the potential to generate.
When Congress created antitrust enforcement by passing
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it recognized the importance of
maintaining this balance by stating that “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.”7 The Supreme
Court has since limited the scope of the Sherman Act by declaring
that Section 1 should not be interpreted so broadly as to apply to all
contracts, but instead should apply to only those that impose
unreasonable restraints on trade.8 In light of this interpretation, the
Court has repeatedly stated that courts should favor the “rule of
reason” when determining the reasonableness, and thereby the
legality, of a restraint.9 The rule of reason enables the fact-finder to
consider all of the circumstances surrounding a restraint, including
its procompetitive justifications.10 In this way, the standard is
supposed to assist the fact-finder in deciding whether a particular
restraint is in fact unreasonable in violation of Section 1.11
Particularly, the Court has emphasized the use of the rule of
reason in cases where the adverse economic impact of a specific
restraint is not obvious because the rule allows courts to scrutinize
that impact to determine whether the restraint actually stifles
competition.12 The Court departs from the rule of reason approach in
favor of a per se standard only when it faces a class of restraints that
has the tendency to always, or almost always, decrease competition
or output.13 The per se standard requires no investigation into the
nature and impact of a restraint; instead the restraint is declared
illegal at the outset.14
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
8. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (quoting
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
9. Id. at 885–86.
10. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1375, 1379 (2009).
11. Id.
12. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885–86.
13. Id. at 886 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
14. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2008); Stucke, supra note 10, at 1378–79; see also
infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the mechanics of the per se rule).
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Nevertheless, even after it declared a particular class of
restraints to be per se illegal, the Court has maintained that it
reserves the freedom to change the appropriate standard to the rule of
reason in any subsequent decision where economic and practical
realities justify the switch.15 The Court has demonstrated its freedom
to change the standard of analysis throughout the evolution of
antitrust enforcement in what has been referred to as a “pattern of
reflexive condemnations.”16 Whenever a state-of-the-art business
practice emerges, and its competitive impact is not yet understood,
courts immediately assume that the practice is contrary to
competitive ideals and condemn it as per se illegal. Then, when the
underlying efficiency explanations prove to be adequate
justifications for the practice, courts ditch the per se standard in favor
of the rule of reason.17 The impact of this pattern is a tendency
toward false positives—findings of illegal conduct when there has
been no actual harm to competition.18 Only after extensive economic
analysis of the procompetitive justifications is the practice eventually
evaluated according to the rule of reason.19
Despite this self-proclaimed grant of power to change the
standard of analysis, the Court has never identified a standard other
than the per se rule and the rule of reason.20 There is, of course, the
“quick look” rule of reason, which shifts the initial burden of proof
from the plaintiff, who no longer has to define the proper market, to
the defendant, who must demonstrate the procompetitive benefits of
the restraint.21 However, the quick-look approach has been criticized
as a pared down version of the rule of reason, offering no novelty or
clarity to the analysis.22 In fact, courts often choose to defer to a full
15. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900; see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997)
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(stating that stare decisis “is not an inexorable command” and that when “the theoretical
underpinnings of [earlier] decisions are called into serious question” because of changes in
economic circumstances and increased experience evaluating the relevant circumstances, the
Court should reconsider “its decisions construing the Sherman Act”).
16. Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust, Economics and Innovation in the Obama Administration,
GCP: THE ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/
files/wright-nov09.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1408–09.
21. Id. at 1410.
22. See id. at 1411–15.
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rule of reason analysis instead of utilizing the quick-look approach.23
In essence, the quick-look approach is no longer a distinct standard
but rather has become a shortcut for a full rule of reason analysis.24
Inexorably, the Supreme Court has not entertained a new
standard of analysis or elaborated on how to accurately apply the rule
of reason; instead it has flip-flopped between the per se standard and
the rule of reason.25 Unfortunately, this approach does nothing to
resolve the problems imposed by the standards as they currently
exist, and it has only increased uncertainty in the law.26 By
continuously failing to clarify the rule of reason or to implement a
new, clearer standard, the Court seems to be hoping that the lower
courts will miraculously generate an accurate and workable standard
from the vague rule of reason it created.27 This is particularly
unsettling because the rule of reason is often criticized for being, in
application, “little more than a euphemism for nonliability.”28
Nonliability can frustrate antitrust objectives because as enforcement
wanes, businesses are permitted to act, unchecked, in their own selfinterest.29 As a result, competition is likely to suffer and, inevitably,
consumers are forced to pay higher prices.30
This Article argues that the Supreme Court is dangerously close
to rendering vertical restraints legal per se. This approach to per se
legality is largely due to the Supreme Court’s mandate in Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,31which required courts
to apply the rule of reason in all vertical-restraint cases but provided
no clear guidance about how to apply the rule. Three factors
contribute to vertical restraints’ succumbing to per se legality: (1)
23. Id. at 1413–15.
24. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219. Indeed, the quick look rule of reason never
quite caught on in the context of vertical restraints and has since lost its traction as a favorable
standard for other types of restraints as well. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1413.
25. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1408–09.
26. Jordan A. Dresnick & Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Vertical Price Agreements in the
Wake of Leegin v. PSKS: Where Do We Stand Now?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 249–50 (2009)
(explaining how the Court’s failure to elaborate on the proper application of the rule of reason in
Leegin will lead to uncertainty in the lower court’s application of the rule).
27. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1490.
28. Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
29. Pamela Jones Harbour, Vertical Restraints: Federal and State Enforcement of Vertical
Issues, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING, Mar. 17–19,
2005, at 3–4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/050329vertical.pdf.
30. Id.
31. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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when courts apply Leegin in conjunction with Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,32 plaintiffs are rarely able to survive the pleading stages;
(2) courts are reluctant to acknowledge when vertical restraints are
being used as a guise for horizontal conduct unless the horizontal
collusion is obvious; and (3) the lower courts are not able to perform
reliable economic analyses of vertical restraints using the rule of
reason under the current modus operandi. This Article contends that
because these factors rarely have led the lower courts to find that a
plaintiff has successfully alleged a violation of Section 1, these
factors have, in effect, caused vertical restraints to come closer to per
se legality than ever.
Ultimately, this Article proposes adopting a rebuttablepresumption-of-illegality standard for evaluating all vertical
restraints on trade. This standard would garner more success for
plaintiffs while preserving the Court’s desire to consider the
economic justifications for imposing restraints. While courts might
consider this to be a dramatic shift from the current standard, the
Court’s shift to the rule of reason has spurred the desertion of vertical
enforcement. Thus, in order to prevent a de facto standard of per se
legality, the Court must take action by articulating a comprehensible
standard for evaluating whether a vertical restraint constitutes an
antitrust violation.
Part II of this Article identifies the need for vertical
enforcement, defines the different types of vertical restraints,
explains the differences between the per se and rule of reason
standards, and tracks the Court’s enforcement of vertical restraints
from their per se origins through the adoption of the rule of reason.
Part III evaluates how the lower courts are currently handling
vertical-restraint cases under the rule of reason and explores whether,
as a result, vertical restraints have been rendered legal per se. Part IV
then proposes that the Court consider replacing the rule of reason
approach with a rebuttable-presumption-of-illegality standard to
evaluate whether an alleged violation constitutes an unreasonable
restraint on competition. Finally, Part V concludes that the Supreme
Court has gone too far by declaring that all vertical restraints be
subject to the rule of reason—thereby causing vertical enforcement

32. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (raising the pleading standard for a plaintiff alleging an antitrust
violation); see infra Part III.A.
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levels to become suboptimal—and that to correct this misstep the
Court must institute a new standard.
II. BACKGROUND
For purposes of determining their legality under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, restraints on trade are categorized as either vertical or
horizontal.33 Vertical restraints arise when an entity in the chain of
distribution, typically a manufacturer, imposes restrictions on an
entity at a different level within the chain, usually a retailer.34
Horizontal restraints, on the other hand, arise when an entity enters
into an agreement with a competitor at the same level of the
distribution chain to eliminate competition.35 Vertical restraints are
generally considered less threatening to antitrust ideals than
horizontal restraints because they do not eliminate competition in the
same way horizontal restraints do.36 Horizontal restraints are more
likely than vertical restraints to eliminate interbrand competition37—
competition between sellers offering similar but distinct products
under different brand names.38 Vertical restraints, on the other hand,
more commonly reduce intrabrand competition39—competition
between entities promoting the same brand of a certain product.40
While the elimination of intrabrand competition may be less
disconcerting than the elimination of interbrand competition,
intrabrand competition is not completely innocuous, and for this
reason, the current level of vertical enforcement is troubling.

33. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219.
34. Id. This Article will discuss both price and nonprice vertical restraints. See infra Part
II.B.
35. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219.
36. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 888 (citing to Arizona v. Maricopa
Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982) (“[H]orizontal restraints are generally less
defensible than vertical restraints.”); Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219; see also infra
notes 150–153 and accompanying text (stating that one of the Court’s main reasons for
overturning the per se standard in Leegin was the difference between the procompetitive
justifications for the two types of restraints).
37. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104–07 (1984) (explaining that a decrease in
horizontal competitors was one anticompetitive consequence of a horizontal agreement).
38. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 264.
39. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977).
40. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 264 n.369.
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A. Conflicting Interests and
the Need for Vertical Enforcement
Vertical antitrust enforcement is thought to be essential for
encouraging competition and protecting consumers because
consumers’ best interests usually do not coincide with the interests of
those imposing the restraints.41 The Supreme Court has advised that
the antitrust laws should be interpreted in a way that protects
interbrand competition more than intrabrand competition, and, as a
result, restraints impacting interbrand competition should be more
carefully scrutinized.42 Nonetheless, eliminating intrabrand
competition elicits antitrust concerns because it is questionable
whether businesses can act as an effective surrogate for consumers’
best interests—frequently, eliminating intrabrand competition leads
to higher prices for consumers.43
Vertical restraints are most utilized by manufacturers.44 Often,
manufacturers decide to develop a chain of distribution, “a network
of independent intermediate distributors and retail outlets,” rather
than to sell products directly to the end consumer.45 This distribution
chain is made up of numerous entities, each seeking to maximize
profits.46 Once a manufacturer sells a good, whether to a dealer or
directly to a consumer, it has collected all the profit possible from
that particular sale.47 As a result, a manufacturer may want to act in
its own self-interest and choose to limit the degree and nature of
intrabrand competition—competition between its dealers—by
imposing vertical restraints.48 Vertical restraints make it possible for
manufacturers to control the market after the initial sale of the
good.49 In other words, vertical restraints enable a manufacturer to
ensure that its dealers will act in accordance with the manufacturer’s
best interest.50 Other common reasons for imposing vertical restraints
include stimulating interbrand competition, increasing the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 238.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007).
PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608.
See id.
Id. at 606.
Harbour, supra note 29, at 3–4.
Id.
PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 606.
See id.
Id. at 606–07.
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availability of customer services, and facilitating entry into the
market for new competitors.51
Regrettably, despite their appeal to manufacturers, vertical
restraints can threaten competition and thus raise antitrust concerns
for other entities in the chain of distribution, particularly
consumers.52 Vertical restraints not only force consumers to pay
higher prices for the same goods and services without receiving any
additional benefits,53 but they also limit dealers’ profit margins
because dealers no longer have the power to set their own prices. In
addition, oftentimes vertical restraints facilitate cartel formation and
market-power abuse, leading to higher prices for consumers.54 This
is often a result of conflicting interests.55 Manufacturers prefer a
decrease in intrabrand competition and an increase in interbrand
competition, and vertical restraints enable manufacturers to realize
this penchant. Unfortunately, consumers’ best interests are not
aligned with this preference, as an increase in both intrabrand and
interbrand competition is most beneficial to consumers.56
Consumer benefit is calculated relative to the number of options
available when purchasing a good, and the availability of options is
proportional to the quantity of intrabrand and interbrand
competition.57 When the Court chose to subject all vertical restraints
to the rule of reason in Leegin, it relied both on the appraisal that
interbrand competition is more valuable to the free market than
intrabrand competition and on the belief that vertical restraints,
51. Jessica L. Taralson, Note, What Would Sherman Do? Overturning the Per Se Illegality
of Minimum Vertical Price Restraints Under the Sherman Act in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. Was Not as Reasonable as It Seemed, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 549,
568–69 (2008); see also Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (“[N]ew
manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce
competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is
often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer. Established
manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide
service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service and
repair are vital for many products . . . . The availability and quality of such services affect a
manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market
imperfections . . . these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services
than if none did.”).
52. Harbour, supra note 29, at 3–4.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Taralson, supra note 51, at 569.
55. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 7.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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specifically minimum resale-price maintenance,58 promote interbrand
competition by encouraging manufacturers to compete for customers
on more than just lower prices.59 Attractive storefronts and customer
service, for example, become more important to product
differentiation when prices are stabilized.60
When it valued interbrand above intrabrand competition, the
Court suggested that manufacturers would effectively act as
fiduciaries for consumers when it imposed vertical restraints on its
retailers.61 But this inevitably begs the question of whether
manufacturers’ interests truly align with those of consumers.62
Justice Breyer is skeptical.63 In his dissent in Leegin, he recognized
the potential for anticompetitive consequences to materialize as
intrabrand competition dwindles.64 Justice Breyer was apprehensive
of minimum resale-price maintenance because it can incentivize
dealers to charge higher prices, can fail to respond to changes in
demand, and can sacrifice efficiency and innovation.65 He was also
worried that minimum resale-price maintenance would trigger
horizontal conspiracies because tacit collusion among manufacturers
is more likely to occur when pricing behavior is easily monitored.66
In Leegin, the majority dismissed the argument that consumers were
harmed by the higher prices resulting from minimum resale-price
maintenance.67 Instead, it assumed that all dealers would be induced
to compete by offering additional customer service and that all
consumers were willing to sacrifice lower price for increased
58. Minimum resale price maintenance is the practice where manufacturers set the lowest
price at which its retailers are permitted to charge consumers for a product. See infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
59. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 238 & n.91 (citing Brief for Petitioner at
19–20, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480),
2007 WL 160780, at *19–20).
60. See id. at 238–39 (explaining that vertical price restraints force retailers “to compete on
more than mere price” by offering extra incentives like “customer service and an attractive
presentation”).
61. See id. at 238 & n.87 (explaining how increased interbrand competition ultimately
benefits consumers); see also PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608 (suggesting that
manufacturers could be thought of as surrogates for consumers’ interests).
62. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608.
63. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 915 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[R]esale price maintenance can
cause harms with some regularity—and certainly when dealers are the driving force.”).
64. Id. at 910–11.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 911.
67. Id. at 895–96 (majority opinion).

Summer 2012]

AN ANTITRUST NARCOTIC

1237

service.68 In doing so, the majority failed to acknowledge that these
suppositions are not always true. The end result is that, regardless of
what complimentary services dealers offer to compensate for higher
prices, when a manufacturer demands that its retailers engage in
minimum price fixing, consumers pay the price—literally.69
Regrettably, the majority in Leegin may have gravely
underestimated the importance of intrabrand competition, and market
realities demonstrate that the relationship between interbrand and
intrabrand competition is, at the very least, more complex than the
majority acknowledged.70 The bottom line is that while eliminating
interbrand competition may be more damaging to competition,
consumers benefit most when both interbrand and intrabrand
competition are exhibited in the market.71
B. Price vs. Nonprice:
Breaking Down Vertical Restraints
Vertical restraints can be classified into two basic categories:
price restraints and nonprice restraints.72 Price and nonprice
restraints, although seemingly distinct, are often difficult to
differentiate for categorization purposes because they “generally
occur under similar circumstances and have an almost identical
economic impact.”73 Usually, vertical price restraints take the form
of price-fixing agreements, also known as resale-price maintenance,
and they surface when a seller sets a specific price—a price ceiling

68. See id. at 891 (“If the consumer can then buy the product from a retailer that discounts
because it has not spent capital providing services or developing a quality reputation, the highservice retailer will lose sales to the discounter, forcing it to cut back its services to a level lower
than consumers would otherwise prefer. Minimum resale price maintenance alleviates the
problem because it prevents the discounter from undercutting the service provider.”).
69. Note, Leegin’s Unexplored “Change in Circumstance”: The Internet and Resale Price
Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1600, 1605 (2008) [hereinafter Change in Circumstance]
(quoting Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1488 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“[T]he one point that emerges clearly in any debate concerning the per se rule is that
minimum vertical price agreements lead to higher, and usually uniform, resale prices.”).
70. See infra notes 321–337 and accompanying text.
71. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 7.
72. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1224.
73. Taralson, supra note 51, at 568; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 727–28 (1988) (discussing the possibility of using vertical nonprice restraints to set
prices).
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(maximum resale price maintenance) or a price floor (minimum
resale price maintenance)—at which a buyer may resell the good.74
Nonprice vertical restraints include a much broader array of
restraints, including customer and territorial restrictions, channel of
distribution restraints, exclusive dealing or distributor agreements,
and tying arrangements.75 Customer and territorial restraints occur
when a supplier or manufacturer mandates that a distributor may not
sell outside of an assigned geographic territory or a particular
demographic of customers.76 For instance, in order to eliminate
competition among its retailers, a gasoline supplier may set different
territorial boundaries for each retailer outside of which each is
prohibited from selling gasoline to consumers. A channel-ofdistribution restraint results when a supplier or manufacturer requires
a distributor to sell solely within a designated “channel of
distribution.”77 Any means by which a good reaches a consumer is
considered a channel of distribution; this includes all intermediate
entities in the chain of distribution and even extends to situations in
which entities decide to utilize the Internet.78 For example, a
manufacturer of expensive designer watches may want to protect the
brand’s high-end reputation by prohibiting distributors from selling
the watches in wholesale stores or over the Internet. Exclusive
dealing arrangements arise when a buyer agrees to buy products or
74. LAWRENCE FULLERTON ET AL., GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: VERTICAL
AGREEMENTS: THE REGULATION OF DISTRIBUTION PRACTICES IN 34 JURISDICTIONS
WORLDWIDE 210 (Stephen Kinsella ed., 2008).
75. Id. A tying arrangement exists when a seller agrees to sell a product to a buyer, but only
if the buyer also purchases another product from the seller. Id. While this Article is limited to
enforcement under Section 1, it should be noted that tying arrangements can also be evaluated
under section 3 of the Clayton Act, which has a quasi per se analysis. See Daniel E. Lazaroff,
Reflections on Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: Continued Confusion
Regarding Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Jurisprudence, 69 WASH. L. REV. 101, 106 (1994).
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is interesting that courts are increasingly considering
the business justifications for tying arrangements, which shows a preference for a rule of reason
type analysis. FULLERTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 212. For a more comprehensive discussion
and history of antitrust enforcement of tying arrangements, see PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at
859; United States v. Loew’s Incorporated, 371 U.S. 38, 44–47 (1962); Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–18 (1984); Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical
Services., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1992); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 33–43 (2006).
76. See FULLERTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 210.
77. Id.
78. See
Distribution
Channel
Definition,
THE
FREE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/distribution+channel (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (defining
distribution channel as “a way of selling a company’s product either directly or via distributors”).
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services exclusively from one seller for a specific period of time.79
Similarly, exclusive distributorship arrangements arise when a
manufacturer agrees that a distributor will have the sole right to sell
products or goods in a certain geographic area.80
C. Standards for Analysis:
Per Se and Rule of Reason
As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s effort to limit the
scope of the Sherman Act to prohibit only those restraints which
unreasonably restrain competition, the Supreme Court has developed
two primary standards of analysis: the per se standard and the rule of
reason.81
1. The Per Se Standard
The Court has consistently held that the per se standard applies
to agreements that “because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue” yield an irrebuttable presumption
of unreasonableness.82 In effect, a court presumes, without
conducting an economic analysis or considering procompetitive
defenses, that certain conduct is unreasonable and, therefore, illegal
per se.83 Implicit in a per se designation is the presumption that any
underlying business reasons for imposing a restraint will always be
less significant than the restraint’s detriment to competition and,
therefore, need not be considered by the court.84 The finality of a per
se classification is severe, in that once a restraint is found to fall into
a class of restraints subject to the per se standard, it is automatically
declared to be illegal.85 The impact of this classification on the
outcome of litigation is unmistakable—once a plaintiff proves that

79. See FULLERTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 210.
80. Id.
81. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1212.
82. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (“We have said that per se rules are appropriate
only for ‘conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive,’ that is, conduct ‘that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.’” (citations omitted)).
83. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1213–14; see also Stucke, supra note 10, at 1379
(“Under the per se rule, once a plaintiff proves an agreement among competitors to engage in the
prohibited conduct, the plaintiff wins.”).
84. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1213–14.
85. Id.
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competitors agreed to engage in conduct that is illegal per se, the
plaintiff wins.86
2. The Rule of Reason
In contrast to the per se standard, the rule of reason is a flexible
standard that requires the fact-finder to consider all of the
circumstances in each case to determine whether the conduct is an
unreasonable restraint on competition.87 Legality, under the rule of
reason, is a question of whether the restraint “merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.”88 To answer that question, the
court must consider several factors, including the facts surrounding
the type of business in which the restraint applies, the business’s
economic condition before and after the restraint became effective,
the nature of the restraint, and the restraint’s actual or probable
economic impact.89 In addition, the court should take into account
the “history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought to be
attained . . . .”90 After evaluating all of these considerations, the court
then determines what the net competitive effect of the restraint is by
balancing the procompetitive justifications against the
anticompetitive implications.91
Another difference between the standards is that the rule of
reason imposes a heightened burden on plaintiffs.92 Under both
standards, the plaintiff must first prove the existence of an agreement
among competitors.93 In rule of reason cases, however, the plaintiff
must then affirmatively prove that the restraint unreasonably restricts
competition.94 That is, the court will not assume unreasonableness, as
86. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1379.
87. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
88. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
89. Id.
90. Id. While good intentions cannot save unreasonable restraints on trade, knowledge of
intent can help the court to interpret the circumstances and predict economic consequences. Id.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Richard Liebeskind & Joseph R. Tiffany, Two Years After Leegin, Questions
Remain on Lawfulness of Resale Price Maintenance, July 31, 2009, at 2, available at http://
www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/053986E13BCE687E8E0CA54E89372048.pdf
(“Leegin’s reasonableness requirement makes the already heightened Twombly standard even
more rigorous in RPM cases.”).
93. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385.
94. See id. at 1385.
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it does in the context of a per se analysis.95 Rather, the plaintiff must
demonstrate an actual or potential anticompetitive impact in the
market and generally must also show that the defendant possesses
market power.96 If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden of proof,
the defendant can then provide procompetitive justifications for
imposing the restraint.97 If the defendant is able to do so, the plaintiff
once again shoulders the burden of proving that that the restraint is
not reasonably necessary.98 If the plaintiff is able to prove this, the
court will then consider whether the anticompetitive effects of the
restraint outweigh the procompetitive justifications.99 Only if the
court finds that the procompetitive benefits do not outweigh the
anticompetitive injuries can the plaintiff prevail.100
D. Vertical Restraint Case Law:
A Pattern of Reflexive Condemnations?
At the outset of antitrust enforcement, the Court could not
identify any procompetitive justifications for imposing vertical
restraints, and thus, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co.,101 the Court deemed them to be illegal per se. However, this
pronouncement has not endured. About fifty years after Dr. Miles,
the Court began to reconsider its blanket condemnation of vertical
restraints. In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,102 the
Court declared that all vertical nonprice restraints would be subject
to the rule of reason.103 Then in Leegin, the Court overturned nearly
one hundred years of precedent when it changed the appropriate
standard for evaluating minimum resale price fixing from the per se
rule to rule of reason, thereby subjecting all vertical restraints to a

95. See id.
96. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315–16 (3d Cir. 2010).
97. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385.
98. Id. at 1385–86.
99. Id. at 1386. During this stage, the court may consider less restrictive alternatives to the
restraint, but the existence of such alternatives does not automatically designate a restraint as
anticompetitive, and, in the same way, the absence of such an alternative does not excuse the
restraint as procompetitive. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271–72 (1963)
(explaining that less restrictive alternatives are one of many considerations for determining
competitive impact).
100. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1386.
101. 220 U.S. 373, 399–409 (1911).
102. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
103. Id. at 44–45, 59.
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rule of reason analysis.104 The Court stated that “[i]t would make no
sense to create out of the single term ‘restraint of trade’ a
chronologically schizoid statute, in which a ‘rule of reason’ evolves
with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se
illegality remains forever fixed where it was.”105 The Court then
declared that when Congress left the interpretation of the scope of
the Sherman Act to the courts, it also granted the courts the power to
decide if that scope must “evolve to meet the dynamics of present
economic conditions.”106 Through the use of this power, the Supreme
Court has created a “pattern of reflexive condemnations” in vertical
enforcement,107 and it is clear that the Court still reserves the power
to alter the standard whenever changing economic realities
necessitate a change in the future.
1. Vertical Nonprice Restraints
Initially, the Supreme Court refused to extend the per se
standard to vertical nonprice restraints, as demonstrated in White
Motor Co. v. United States.108 The Court recognized that this case
was the first time that it was evaluating a vertical territorial
restriction and, as such, stated that “[w]e need to know more than we
do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to
decide whether they . . . should be classified as per se violations of
the Sherman Act.”109 The Court wanted to discern more information
about the economic and business reasons for imposing the
geographic restrictions and their actual impact on competition before
condemning them as illegal per se.110
Not long after that decision, the Court disregarded the hesitation
it demonstrated in White, declaring all vertical nonprice restraints
illegal per se in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.111 Instead of
considering the economic effects of the territorial restraints that
Schwinn imposed on its retailers, the Court relied on property law
theories to justify the switch to the per se standard.112 The Court
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Leegin Creative Prods. Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
Id. at 900 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988)).
Id. at 899.
See Wright, supra note 16, at 2.
372 U.S. 253, 255–57 (1963).
Id. at 263.
See id.
388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
Id. at 374–78.
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stated that once a manufacturer “parts with dominion over his
product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reverse
control over its destiny or the conditions of its resale.”113 The Court
then reasoned that a manufacturer attempting to control future sales
of a product after the title passed to a purchaser would have no other
motive but to eliminate competition.114 In the Court’s opinion, this
was enough to validate a per se condemnation.115
However, the Schwinn ruling was short lived. Just ten years
later, the Court reconsidered the per se classification for all vertical
nonprice restraints in Sylvania.116 In an effort to reinvigorate its
dwindling market share, Sylvania had undertaken a new marketing
strategy and, as part of its strategy, eliminated its distributors from
the retail chain and instead sold directly to franchised retailers.117
Sylvania then imposed limitations on the franchisors by limiting
them to selling Sylvania products only from their specific franchised
location while maintaining the ability to increase or decrease retailers
as it deemed appropriate.118 The Court was concerned about applying
a per se rule to the limitations in Sylvania’s franchise agreements
because it wanted to know more about the actual impact of the
arrangements on competition before proclaiming that they were
unjustified and only had a “pernicious effect on competition.”119
The Court pointed out that, although it is possible for vertical
restrictions to reduce intrabrand competition, the restrictions
generally prompt an increase of interbrand competition because
manufacturers often use the restrictions to become more competitive
with each other.120 It was this potential increase in interbrand
competition that the Court accepted as a reasonable justification for
restraining competition. In fact, the Court explained that due to
market imperfections, specifically the “free rider”121 problem,
113. Id. at 379.
114. Id. at 379–81.
115. Id. at 382.
116. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
117. Id. at 38.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 50 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
120. Id. at 54–55.
121. The free-rider problem arises when consumers utilize the services that a full-price
retailer offers but ultimately purchase a good from a discount retailer who offers lower prices but
no services. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1615. For a more complete discussion of
free riding, see infra Part III.C.1.
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restrictions may sometimes be necessary to preserve service quality
and distribution efficiency.122 The Court clarified that a “departure
from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable
economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”123 It
then held that, due to the procompetitive justifications, the rule of
reason was the appropriate test for all vertical nonprice restraints.124
2. Vertical Price Restraints
In 1911, Dr. Miles first brought antitrust enforcement of vertical
price fixing to the Court’s attention.125 In Dr. Miles, the Court
deemed vertical price fixing illegal per se because it could find no
difference between vertical and horizontal price fixing.126 Dr. Miles
Medical Company was a drug manufacturer that sought to impose a
minimum resale price on its distributors and all other subsequent
purchasers in the chain of distribution.127 At issue was whether the
manufacturer could impose such restrictions.128 In reaching its
decision, the Court ignored the economic impact of the restrictions
and instead relied on the property concept of restraints on
alienation.129 The Court explained that once a purchaser has secured
full ownership of a product, the purchaser shall be free from
restrictions on any future uses.130
The Court also found that the agreement among the
manufacturer, the wholesalers, and the retailers to set retail prices
was an obvious restraint on trade because it stifled competition.131
The Court stated that the manufacturer had created “a system of
interlocking restrictions” through which it attempted to control not
only the prices set by its agents but also the prices set by all dealers
in all industry-wide sales.132 The Court clarified that while
reasonable restraints of trade are allowed, vertical price fixing was
not reasonable because, like horizontal price fixing, there were no
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54–56.
Id. at 58–59.
Id.
See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
See id. at 407–08.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 404–05.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 399.
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procompetitive benefits.133 The Court determined that the only
possible motivation for invoking such restrictions was a desire to set
prices and eliminate price competition.134 As a result, the Court
classified vertical price fixing within the same category as horizontal
price fixing agreements and declared it to be illegal per se.135
More than eighty-five years after Dr. Miles, the Court began the
shift to the rule of reason in State Oil Co. v. Khan136 when it
reevaluated the suitability of the per se standard for analyzing
maximum price fixing.137 Barkat Khan had entered into an agreement
to lease and operate a gas station owned by State Oil and purchase its
gasoline supply from State Oil.138 The agreement required that if
Khan decided to sell gasoline at a price higher than State Oil’s
suggested retail price, he would rebate the excess profits to State
Oil.139 By imposing this restriction, State Oil had likely established a
maximum resale price140—a per se violation of the Sherman Act
according to Dr. Miles.141 However, instead of invoking stare decisis,
the Court determined that maximum resale price fixing could be
distinguished from minimum resale price fixing because the former
does not encourage higher prices, and thus it does not harm
competition and consumers.142 The Court then held that the rule of
reason should apply to maximum resale price fixing.143
Then, just ten years later, the Court completed the transition to
the rule of reason in Leegin when it once again decided to “temper,
limit, or overrule once strict prohibitions on vertical restraints.”144
The Court took the last step in relaxing vertical enforcement by
holding that the per se standard should no longer apply to minimum
resale price maintenance.145 Leegin sold belts and other women’s
fashion accessories under the name “Brighton” to over five thousand
retailers, primarily independent boutiques and specialty stores, one of
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 408.
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 15.
Id. at 22.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 901 (2007).
Id. at 907.
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which was PSKS.146 Leegin had a policy of refusing to deal with any
retailer who would not comply with its minimum suggested retail
prices.147 When Leegin discovered that PSKS had been cutting prices
by 20 percent across the entire line, it requested that PSKS comply
with the suggested price, but PSKS refused.148
On appeal before the Court, Leegin did not deny the existence of
the agreement fixing minimum resale prices but instead argued that
the rule of reason was the appropriate standard for determining
whether its policy was in violation of the Sherman Act.149 In the
years following Dr. Miles, the Court had continued to worry that
vertical agreements produced the same anticompetitive effects as
horizontal agreements and, as such, had declined to switch to the rule
of reason.150 However, in Leegin, the Court recognized that the more
recent case law no longer treated vertical and horizontal conduct as
analogous and found the property concepts applied in Dr. Miles were
outdated.151 As a result, the Court reconsidered the economic impacts
of the two classes of restraints.152 In the end, the Court agreed with
Leegin that vertical price fixing, unlike horizontal price fixing, could
have procompetitive justifications, including an increase of
interbrand competition, a decrease in the prevalence of free riders,
and an increased facilitation for new market entrants.153
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that, although higher
prices were a potential consequence, they were not sufficient to hold
minimum resale price fixing to a per se standard without an
additional showing of anticompetitive conduct.154 Instead, the Court
stressed that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote
interbrand competition, not to protect consumers from high prices.155
Despite this proclamation, the Court assured the parties that the “rule
of reason [was] designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive
transactions from the market.”156 It also warned the lower courts to
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 884–85.
Id. at 887–89.
Id.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 890–92.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 895–96.
Id. at 898.
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be diligent in eliminating the anticompetitive uses of vertical price
restraints from the market, particularly when policing entities with
dominant market power that could be disguising a cartel with vertical
price fixing.157
III. DOWN FOR THE COUNT:
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS ARE LEGAL PER SE
UNDER THE RULE OF REASON
In spite of its admission in Leegin that anticompetitive impacts
could outweigh the procompetitive effects of vertical restraints, the
Court tasked the lower courts with devising their own rules and
fabricating their own litigation structures to guarantee that the rule of
reason would eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market.158
Consequently, after Leegin, there was a great deal of uncertainty as
to how the lower courts would interpret the Court’s strategy for an
effective rule of reason analysis.159 Since Sylvania and Leegin,
federal courts160 have employed the rule of reason in vertical price
and nonprice restraint cases, and while courts seem to be heeding the
advice of the Supreme Court—to develop their own methods for
performing a rule of reason analysis—plaintiffs seeking vertical
enforcement have experienced very limited success.161 This should
not come as a surprise to many, as one of the primary criticisms of
the rule of reason is that enforcement levels become suboptimal
because plaintiffs have difficulty overcoming the high burden of
proof.162 Under the rule of reason, plaintiffs must first satisfy their
initial burden of proof by sufficiently alleging the existence of an
157. Id. at 897–98.
158. Id. at 898–99.
159. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 249–50.
160. The scope of this Article is limited to federal courts, but it is worth noting that although
many states chose to harmonize their antitrust laws with federal antitrust laws, Leegin is not
binding precedent on the states. Michael A. Lindsay, State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After
Leegin, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct09_Lindsay10_23f.authcheckdam.pdf. After Leegin, it
was unclear how the states would deal with vertical restraint enforcement. Id. Some state courts
rejected the per se standard and at least one state had even taken measures to proclaim its outright
rejection of Leegin. Id. at 2. Less than two years after Leegin, Maryland passed legislation
declaring that minimum resale price fixing was unlawful per se. Id. at 2. For a more detailed
discussion of state antitrust enforcement after Leegin, see id. at 1–7, and Lindsay, Overview of
State RPM, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/source_lindsay_chart.authcheckdam.pdf.
161. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 257–65.
162. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1620.
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agreement that unreasonably restrains competition and must then
prove that the restraint’s anticompetitive harms outweigh any
procompetitive justifications.163 Satisfying the second burden has
become particularly challenging in light of courts’ willingness to
accept the facile procompetitive justifications that a restraint
promotes interbrand competition or counteracts the free-rider
problem.164 The suboptimal enforcement existing under the rule of
reason leads many skeptics to declare that, in application, the rule of
reason operates as a de facto rule of legality.165
In Sylvania and Leegin, the Supreme Court endorsed a rule of
reason approach and never expressly sanctioned a per se legality
standard.166 However, notwithstanding the Court’s intention, there is
substantial data and literature supporting the idea that the rule of
reason defaults to a rule of per se legality.167 For example, thenJudge Ginsburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit conducted a survey of the outcome of all vertical
nonprice restraint cases following the Court’s decision in Sylvania.168
She found that from 1977 until 1991, federal district courts
considered forty-five cases alleging an antitrust violation, and, of
those, plaintiffs lost forty-one.169 This exposes that, following the
Court’s decision to subject nonprice restraints to the rule of reason,
less than 10 percent of plaintiffs won cases alleging an antitrust
violation.170 Moreover, there also is evidence that maximum vertical
price fixing has suffered a similar fate by becoming “de facto legal”
since the Court’s decision to subject the practice to the rule of reason
in Khan.171 Perhaps most revealing, one study demonstrates that in
the decade from 1999 and 2009, plaintiffs lost 221 out of all 222

163. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385.
164. See William Kolasky, Review of How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, 5
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 173, 177 (2009) (noting that scholars recently identified this trend).
165. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free
Rider Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 507 (2010) (referencing criticisms by Judge Richard
Posner and Judge Douglas Ginsburg); Kelly, supra note 4, at 635–40.
166. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Lao, supra note 165, at 507.
167. See Lao, supra note 165, at 507–10.
168. Id. at 508.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1911, 1912 (2009)).
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cases subject to the rule of reason that reached final judgment.172
That is, plaintiffs lost more than 99 percent of cases under the rule of
reason in a ten-year period.173
The extreme scarcity of successful claims under the rule of
reason raises a red flag, and while these studies alone are not
determinative, they certainly suggest that the rule of reason standard
has resulted in per se legality.174 The mounting concern for plaintiffs
who are unable to win under the rule of reason is further evidenced
by reflexive actions taken by Congress and state governments
following the Leegin decision, including a Senate bill proposal that
would overturn Leegin175 and many state laws proclaiming that
vertical price fixing remained illegal per se.176 The Senate bill,
proposed less than four months after Leegin, disparaged Leegin
outright and explicitly disclosed that the bill’s purpose was to
overturn the Court’s decision and return vertical minimum price
fixing to a per se standard.177 The bill, since renamed the Discount
Pricing Consumer Protection Act, has been a highly controversial
topic in Congressional hearings and has not yet been passed.178
Contributing further to this unrest is the contention that the Court has
exceeded its congressional grant of authority by forgoing the original
intention of the Sherman Act and choosing, instead, to favor its own
ideologies.179 The argument is not that policy concessions should

172. Id. (citing Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 (2009)). It is fair to point out that at least some cases
settle before final judgment; therefore, plaintiffs may have a higher likelihood of prevailing under
the rule of reason than these studies reveal. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1424.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 643.
176. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
177. Kelly, supra note 4, at 643.
178. Ariana E. Gillies, Note, Not with a Bang, But a Whimper: Congress’s Proposal to
Overturn the Supreme Court’s Leegin Decision with the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection
Act of 2009, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 645, 646 (2011). A version of the bill died in
committee in 2009; in 2011, Senator Herbert Kohl and Representative Henry Johnson sponsored
new versions of the bill, neither of which has been passed into law. Discount Pricing Consumer
Protection Act of 2009, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3190 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2012); Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2011, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3406 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); Discount Pricing
Consumer Protection Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s75 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2012).
179. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1480–81.
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never be made, but that the legislature—not the courts—should be
responsible for making that assessment.180
Although the Supreme Court might have intended the rule of
reason to be a flexible replacement for the per se rule, it erred by
continuing to ignore the infirmities associated with conducting a rule
of reason analysis. The Court failed to articulate a clear standard of
analysis in Sylvania and then neglected to do so again in Leegin. This
lack of guidance is particularly unsettling because the Court said that
the lower courts’ ineffectiveness in conducting an accurate economic
analysis was a primary factor contributing to its decision in Leegin to
switch to the rule of reason.181 Yet, despite the Court’s
acknowledgement that the lower courts were not familiar enough
with the competitive effects of vertical restraints to validate a per se
rule, the Court somehow had confidence that the lower courts were
familiar enough to develop their own standards for conducting a rule
of reason analysis.182
As one commentator pointed out, “[t]he Court’s shift from per
se rules would be an unsurprising reflection of the Court’s increased
confidence in its or the lower courts’ capacity to adjudicate complex
economic issues . . . .”183 However, this is not the case with antitrust
analysis—the Court has actually become more skeptical of the
judiciary’s competence to issue consistent and accurate rulings in
recent years.184
Lower courts’ inability to evaluate the impact of economic
changes, which include difficulty allocating the proper weight to
policy considerations, may be the biggest concern for plaintiffs, but
additional obstacles have contributed to plaintiffs’ limited success in
recent vertical-restraint cases. Such difficulties include an increased
burden at the pleading stage in the wake of Leegin and Twombly,185
and the issue of how the lower courts identify the horizontal effects
of vertical agreements—except in cases exhibiting clear proof of

180. Id.
181. Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2.
182. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898–99 (2007).
183. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1408.
184. Id. at 1408–09 (citing Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82
(2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414–15 (2004)).
185. See Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2 (“Leegin’s reasonableness requirement
makes the already heightened Twombly standard even more rigorous . . . .”).
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horizontal collusion.186 When viewed in the aggregate, these issues
bolster the concerns that the lower courts are applying a rule of
reason analysis that fails to protect the market from anticompetitive
conduct, and thereby results in a de facto declaration of per se
legality for vertical restraints.
A. Leegin and Twombly:
Sounding the Death Knell
for Vertical Restraint Liability
When a pleading standard is too high, it becomes nearly
impossible for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.187 In vertical-restraint cases, this heightened pleading
standard essentially operates as a presumption of legality. Twombly
increased the burden on plaintiffs in the pleading stages of antitrust
cases by requiring them to disclose enough factual information to
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was plausible and not just
possible.188 On its own, Twombly does not seem to create an
impenetrable standard for pleading, but when combined with Leegin,
it might.
1. Plausible Pleadings as
Required by Twombly
In Twombly, consumers brought a putative class action against
numerous major telecommunications providers, alleging that the
providers violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.189 In their
complaint, the consumers did not provide proof of a tacit unlawful
agreement between the providers but instead pointed to the
providers’ parallel conduct to prove an agreement existed.190 The
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs had
not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.”191 The Court explained that to survive a motion to
dismiss, plaintiffs must plead not just a “short and plain statement of

186. See infra Part III.B.
187. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 67–68 (2010) (discussing a high dismissal rate after
Twombly).
188. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
189. Id. at 550.
190. Id. at 564.
191. Id. at 570.
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the claim” but enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”192
In reaching its decision, the Court warned plaintiffs of the
danger of pleading only ambiguous parallel or interdependent
conduct, stating that such conduct could just as easily be consistent
with a conspiracy as it could with a “wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
perceptions of the market.”193 In an effort to prevent superfluous
litigation, the Court required plaintiffs to provide in the pleadings a
stronger showing of a violation.194 While the plaintiffs in Twombly
alleged a horizontal conspiracy among competitors, and not a vertical
agreement, Twombly set the bar for the level of particularity required
of pleadings in all antitrust cases.195 Typically, there is no need to
circumstantially prove the existence of concerted action in verticalrestraint cases because an agreement is usually clear; however,
Twombly affects vertical-restraint cases by requiring plaintiffs to
provide enough factual assertions of anticompetitive conduct in their
complaints to allege an unreasonable restraint on trade that would
entitle them to relief.196
2. An Insurmountable Standard?
A Plaintiff’s Plight in the
Wake of Leegin and Twombly
By requiring more than mere allegations of anticompetitive
conduct, Twombly forced plaintiffs to think twice before filing a
complaint.197 Leegin then added an additional burden for plaintiffs to
garner antitrust enforcement in vertical-restraint cases.198 After
Leegin, plaintiffs had to successfully plead not only the existence of
an agreement restraining competition but also the unreasonableness
of the restraint.199 Many courts have since gone as far as requiring
plaintiffs to show that the restraint does not merely have the potential
192. Id. at 555.
193. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 497; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.
194. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
195. See id. at 555–56.
196. See id.
197. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 499.
198. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 250.
199. See Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2 (stating that in resale-price-maintenance
cases, plaintiffs must allege facts that plausibly suggest that an agreement exists and that is
unreasonable).
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to harm competition but that it does in fact harm competition.200 This
additional element requires plaintiffs to sufficiently establish the
relevant market and the anticompetitive impact of a restraint.201 The
lower courts have consistently emphasized that plaintiffs must satisfy
this increased burden at the pleading stage.202
Prior to Leegin, plaintiffs often would describe only general
allegations of anticompetitive conduct in their pleadings because
defendants typically concealed such conduct, making it difficult to
prove the allegations prior to discovery.203 As a result, plaintiffs
relied heavily on discovery to produce proof of antitrust violations.204
However, this is no longer a viable strategy in the wake of Leegin
and Twombly.205
Leegin’s subsequent case history is particularly interesting.206
After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, the district court
granted Leegin’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and PSKS subsequently
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.207 Citing Twombly, the Fifth Circuit
stated that in order to survive the pleading stages, the plaintiffs must
describe “sufficient factual matter” and not mere “labels and
conclusions.”208 The Fifth Circuit also explained that, in antitrust
cases, this rule requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defendant’s
conduct actually harmed competition.209 The court then clarified that,
according to Leegin, higher prices alone do not sufficiently identify
an unreasonable restraint on competition.210 Instead, the court
pointed out that when pleading resale-price-maintenance claims,
plaintiffs must “plausibly define the relevant product and geographic

200. See, e.g., Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); PSKS, Inc. v.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l,
Inc., 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010); Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV187, 2008 WL 3914461 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008). According to lower courts, potential to harm
competition is not sufficient unless a defendant also possesses market power, and some courts
have even stated that actual harm to consumers, such as higher prices, is insufficient to overcome
the procompetitive benefits as well. See Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1339–40.
201. Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (2010).
207. Id. at 414.
208. Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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markets”211 and then “plausibly allege the defendant’s market power
[in those markets].”212 After laying out the standards for defining a
relevant market, the Fifth Circuit determined that PSKS failed to
adequately define the relevant product market.213 As a result, the
court held that PSKS’s claim could not survive the motion to dismiss
because the complaint failed to sufficiently plead that Leegin
possessed market power and did not allege any other injury to
competition.214
Similarly, in a different case against Leegin, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee had to evaluate
whether a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was appropriate in light of
Leegin and Twombly.215 The facts of the case and the vertical pricefixing agreement were the same as those laid out in Leegin, except
the plaintiff, Spahr, was a different retailer.216 The court dismissed
Spahr’s definition of the relevant product market because reasonable
substitute products for the Brighton brand were available.217 The
court also found that Spahr’s evidence that the agreement led to
higher prices was inadequate to demonstrate sufficient
anticompetitive harm.218 Ultimately, the court decided that Spahr had
not appropriately pleaded a cause of action against Leegin.219
This trend has gained traction in other jurisdictions as well.220 In
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.,221 the Eleventh Circuit
applied a two-step analysis when evaluating whether the plaintiff’s
pleadings were sufficient.222 In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged
the existence of an anticompetitive price-fixing agreement between a
mattress manufacturer and its distributor.223 According to the court,
the first step of the analysis calls for a determination of “whether the
211. Id. at 417.
212. Id. at 419.
213. Id. at 419–20.
214. Id.
215. See Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461,
at *1 (E.D. Tenn Aug. 20, 2008).
216. Id. at *2–3.
217. Id. at *11.
218. Id. at *11–12.
219. Id. at *16.
220. See, e.g., Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); Jacobs v.
Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010).
221. 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010).
222. Id. at 1333 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
223. Id. at 1331–33.
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complaint’s averments are more than bare legal conclusions,” and the
second step involves “examin[ing] the complaint for a sufficient
quantum of allegations to plausibly suggest” that a vertical
agreement to restrain trade existed and violated the Sherman Act.224
The court found that the pleadings satisfied the first step of the
process but did not adequately identify the relevant market and,
therefore, could not satisfy the second step.225 Jacobs defined the
relevant market as “visco-elastic foam mattresses” in the complaint
but did not provide any factual economic data about the consumer
demand for these mattresses.226 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that a subset of a larger market can be identified as the relevant
market, but only when there is a separate consumer demand for the
product, and this demand must be pleaded in accordance with
Twombly.227 The court then noted that even if Jacobs had properly
defined the relevant market, the complaint still would not have
satisfied Twombly because it failed to provide more than “bald
statement[s]” alleging anticompetitive harm and market power.228
Then in 2011, the Ninth Circuit jumped on board with this trend
in Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., when it held that merely pleading
general harm to consumers, namely higher prices, was insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.229 Instead, the Ninth Circuit required the
plaintiffs to point to a specific injury to competition.230 In Brantley, a
class of plaintiffs asked the Ninth Circuit to reverse the district
court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a valid claim. 231 The
plaintiffs, a class of television subscribers, alleged that television
programmers and distributors had violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act by bundling channels and effectively compelling consumers into
purchasing multi-channel packages.232 The Ninth Circuit stated that
plaintiffs “may not substitute allegations of injury to the claimants
224. Id. at 1333.
225. Id. at 1333, 1336.
226. Id. at 1338.
227. Id. at 1337–38.
228. Id. at 1339–40.
229. 675 F.3d 1192, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit first decided Brantley in
June 2011 but later withdrew the opinion and issued the superseding opinion cited in this Article.
Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 649 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) opinion withdrawn, 661
F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2011) and superseded, 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1195–96.
232. Id.
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for allegations of injury to competition.”233 The court then found that
the television subscribers had not claimed a sufficient injury to
competition by merely pointing out that the bundles hurt consumers
through reducing choice and increasing prices.234 Although the court
acknowledged that an industry-wide practice is more likely to be
anticompetitive and should therefore be scrutinized more carefully, it
refused to delve any deeper because the subscribers had not
adequately explained in their pleadings how this widespread practice
harmed competition.235
However, a few cases have proven that sufficiently pleading a
vertical-restraint violation is possible.236 For instance, in
Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.,237 the plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss after alleging an anticompetitive price-fixing
agreement.238 There, Toys ‘R’ Us entered into agreements with
product manufacturers to ensure that the manufacturers would
impose minimum resale-price restraints on their retailers in order to
prevent smaller retailers from undercutting Toys ‘R’ Us’s prices.239
In denying the motion to dismiss, the court stated that plaintiffs had
pleaded their claim—by defining the relevant market, identifying
concerted action, proving the anticompetitive nature of the action,
and establishing a causal nexus—with enough “heft” to satisfy
Twombly.240 However, following the court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss, the parties settled the case, and the court never determined
Toys ‘R’ Us’s liability under the rule of reason.241
233. Id. at 1200.
234. Id. at 1201–02.
235. Id. at 1203–03.
236. E.g., Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 580–84.
239. Id. at 579.
240. Id. at 579–84.
241. Amaris Elliott-Engel, $35 Million Settlement Approved in Baby Products Antitrust Class
Action, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 16, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/
pg/12016/1203332-499.stm. This demonstrates a common trend that, even when plaintiffs have
stated an antitrust injury sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, they often settle to avoid the
expense of continued litigation and uncertainty under the rule of reason. Heather M. Cooper,
What a ‘Babies “R” Us’ Class Action Lawsuit Can Teach Us About Successful Distribution
Strategies for the Current Legal and Economic Climate, ANTITRUST L. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2009/09/articles/what-a-babies-r-us-class-action-lawsuit-canteach-us-about-successful-distribution-strategies-for-the-current-legal-and-economic-climate/.
The concern with this trend is that plaintiffs are not being adequately compensated for the damage
that vertical restraints inflict. Id.
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In sum, the subsequent history of Leegin and the Spahr, Jacobs,
and Brantley line of cases demonstrate the difficulty that plaintiffs
currently encounter at the pleading stage in the wake of Twombly and
Leegin. In most of these cases, the plaintiffs were not able to
overcome the initial burden of proof, and, unfortunately, this is
becoming the norm for plaintiffs attempting to allege an antitrust
violation under the rule of reason. Babyage proves that, while
difficult, plaintiffs can successfully plead an unreasonable restriction
on competition under the rule of reason. However, even when
plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss, they often enter into settlement
agreements, as seen in Babyage, because both parties recognize the
costs and risks associated with undertaking a full rule of reason
analysis at trial.242 In either case, empirical evidence seems to
suggest that, under the rule of reason, nearly all plaintiffs lose on
motions to dismiss because they have not sufficiently pleaded an
antitrust injury.243 Given this, it is arguable that a heightened
pleading standard has contributed to the per se legality of vertical
restraints.244
B. Pleading Vertical Agreement
and Horizontal Collusion:
Not a Plaintiff’s Saving Grace
The Supreme Court’s earliest decisions concerning vertical price
fixing reflected the belief that such restraints enabled manufacturers
and retailers to conspire with each other or, in other words, to engage
in horizontal price fixing.245 One of the most prominent criticisms of
evaluating vertical restraints under the rule of reason is that vertical
restraints, specifically price restraints, increase horizontal collusion
among competitors and can lead to more stabilized cartels among
dealers and manufacturers.246 A few antitrust scholars even contend
that the distinction between horizontal and vertical conduct is
nonsensical.247 They argue that the relevant inquiry should not be
whether one entity “imposed” a restriction on another entity but
242. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1424.
243. Id. at 1423.
244. See Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2.
245. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1602; see, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
246. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 607.
247. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1238–39.
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rather whether the restriction operates in an anticompetitive
manner.248
Parties often implement horizontal and vertical restraints,
specifically price fixing, with the same goals in mind—to increase
profits and reduce competition.249 Therefore the existence of one
type of restraint can promulgate the existence of the other.250
Horizontal price fixing results from vertical price fixing because
manufacturers lose their incentive to undercut each other’s prices as
vertical price fixing stabilizes prices across the market.251 If an
industry-wide standard for resale pricing exists, manufacturers will
prefer to maintain the status quo in order to continue taking
advantage of higher profit margins.252 Engaging in price competition
by lowering prices no longer drives up a manufacturer’s sales
volume; instead, it only causes that manufacturer’s profits to
suffer.253 This is because when price maintenance agreements
regulate what price retailers may charge, retailers can no longer pass
any reduction in a manufacturer’s wholesale price along to
consumers.254 Therefore, in markets rife with resale price
maintenance, the only beneficiaries of undercutting are retailers, and
competition at the manufacturer level suffers as a result.255 The
capacity for vertical restraints to disguise horizontal collusion creates
a conspicuous hazard that per se illegal conduct is going undetected.
1. Horizontal vs. Vertical:
The Significance of Categorization
Before the Court overruled Dr. Miles and Schwinn, the
horizontal ramifications of vertical restrictions were immaterial to
the standard of analysis because both horizontal and vertical
restraints were considered illegal per se. However, once the Court
changed the standard for vertical restraints to the rule of reason,
discerning what type of conduct was at issue became essential to

248. Id.
249. Taralson, supra note 51, at 581–82.
250. Id.
251. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1605.
252. Kelly, supra note 4, at 627.
253. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1605.
254. Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490–91 (1983).
255. See id.
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determining legality.256 This can be directly attributed to the weight
that characterizing a restraint as horizontal or vertical has on the
outcome of a case—plaintiffs win under the per se rule and almost
always lose under the rule of reason.257 Accordingly, plaintiffs
attempt to trigger a per se standard by fitting the restraint into a
“forbidden box,” and meanwhile defendants work to keep it out of
such a box and subject to a more lenient rule of reason analysis.258
Inevitably, categorization has become the primary concern of
litigants, thereby making it imperative for courts to ensure that
vertical restraints are not used as a pretense to conceal an innately
unlawful horizontal conspiracy.259
However, determining when vertical agreements buttress
horizontal collusion is no easy feat.260 In Sylvania, the Court
recognized that, at times, courts may struggle to distinguish between
horizontal and vertical restraints.261 The pleading requirements set
forth in Twombly require that plaintiffs clearly allege the existence of
a horizontal agreement before a court can consider applying the per
se rule.262 Therefore, alleging horizontal conspiracy is especially
difficult in cases where there is merely concerted action but no
explicit agreement.263 In particular, vertical price maintenance is
extremely challenging to prove due to the ease with which
competitors are able to enter into an unspoken agreement by just
monitoring each other’s prices.264
Therefore, because characterizing a restraint as horizontal or
vertical proves to be outcome determinative, plaintiffs have more
incentive to classify restraints as horizontal whenever possible to
take advantage of the per se analysis.265And although plaintiffs have
typically had very little success overcoming motions to dismiss after
Twombly, they have been triumphant when they prove that a
256. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1232–33.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 627.
261. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977).
262. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–49, 556–57 (2007); id. at 571–72
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 627.
264. Id.
265. See Comment, Vertical Agreement as a Horizontal Restraint: Centuro, Inc. v. United
Cabinet Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REV. 622, 644–45 n.138 (1980).
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horizontal conspiracy was disguised by vertical conduct.266 For
example, plaintiffs win when they can prove that vertical price fixing
was the result of a horizontal agreement to fix prices.267
2. Pleading Horizontal Collusion Pays Off
Not long after Leegin, the Fifth Circuit clarified in Tunica Web
Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass’n. that a vertical refusal
to deal would be per se illegal if it resulted from a horizontal
agreement among competitors.268 In Tunica, an Internet-advertising
agency held the rights to the domain address tunica.com.269 The
agency proposed to all of the casinos in Tunica County, Mississippi,
that they could lease the rights to the address for $2,500 per month,
meaning that when web browsers clicked on tunica.com, they would
be redirected to the Tunica County Tourism Commission’s website,
which featured information about each of the casinos.270 The casinos
declined unanimously.271 The Fifth Circuit explained that the
industry-wide refusal to agree to the proposal was not a sufficient
violation.272 However, when the casinos subsequently entered into a
“gentleman’s agreement” refusing to deal with the agency for the
purpose of rendering tunica.com worthless, the court found that the
casinos had crossed from vertical conduct into a horizontal
agreement to boycott.273 The court then remanded the case with
instructions that the district court reconsider whether the rule of
reason was the appropriate standard for evaluating this type of
horizontal group boycott.274 In doing so, the court stressed that
Leegin required the per se rule only when “courts can predict with
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances
under the rule of reason.”275

266. Peter Sullivan & Craig Linder, Vertical Restraints, in 48TH ANNUAL ADVANCED
ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING VOLUME ONE 45, 69–70 (2009).
267. Id.
268. 496 F.3d 403, 406–08, 411–15 (5th Cir. 2007).
269. Id. at 406.
270. Id. at 407.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 410.
273. See id. at 410–11, 414.
274. Id. at 414–15.
275. Id. at 414 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87
(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Leegin, a district court
in the Eastern District of Wisconsin applied the per se rule to a
statute that encouraged both vertical and horizontal agreement in
Lotus Business Group, LLC v. Flying J Inc.276 In Flying J, a gasoline
retailer alleged that a competitor had violated a Wisconsin statute
requiring gasoline retailers to increase their resale price by at least
9.18 percent.277 The competitor asserted as an affirmative defense
that the enforcement of the statute violated the Supremacy Clause by
establishing price fixing in contravention of the Sherman Act.278 The
court agreed that the statute constituted an antitrust violation and
subjected it to per se analysis.279 Following Leegin, the district court
reconsidered the statute under the rule of reason, but it upheld its
application of the per se rule, finding that the statute created
horizontal price fixing by setting an industry-wide standard.280 The
court declared that it would still evaluate horizontal cartels as per se
violations even when vertical price fixing was also involved.281
Furthermore, the court said that the statute would be unlawful
regardless of whether it was evaluated under the per se standard or
the rule of reason because it constituted a vertical price-fixing
agreement intended to facilitate a horizontal cartel.282 The court also
contrasted this situation with one in which only a few manufacturers,
without market power, implement the practice, concluding that
vertical price fixing deserves more careful scrutiny when many
competing manufacturers adopt the practice or when there is a strong
showing of market power.283
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit confirmed in TFWS, Inc. v.
Franchot that horizontal price fixing would remain distinguishable
from vertical price fixing and would continue to be illegal per se.284
Following Leegin, the state of Maryland asked the Fourth Circuit to
reevaluate whether it was appropriate to apply the per se rule to its
liquor and wine price-setting regulations.285 Maryland claimed that in
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

532 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1012–13.
Id. at 1012, 1017–18.
Id. at 1028–29.
Id. at 1028.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
572 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 188.
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Leegin the Supreme Court declared that all resale price maintenance
would be subject to rule of reason analysis.286 The Fourth Circuit
refused to accept this argument because the Court considered only
vertical restraints in Leegin and not horizontal price fixing like that
being implemented by Maryland.287 In reaffirming its earlier decision
to apply the per se rule, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Leegin as
confirming the importance of using the per se standard when
evaluating horizontal agreements restricting competition.288
These cases indicate the willingness of courts to apply the per se
rule when plaintiffs successfully establish that there is a horizontal
agreement in effect. Thus, at least some courts seem capable of
distinguishing between horizontal collusion and agreements among
entities within the chain of distribution. However, not all courts are
on the same page, and plaintiffs continue to struggle to meet the
burden of proving horizontal conspiracy in cases where there is
evidence of both horizontal and vertical agreements.
3. Not an Absolute:
Courts Are Reluctant to
Classify Restraints as Horizontal
Despite the success plaintiffs have had when they are able to
establish that defendants’ vertical restraints are actually horizontal in
nature, the courts are reluctant to make such characterizations by
merely implying that vertical restraints have horizontal
repercussions.289 In Leegin, the Supreme Court reminded the lower
courts that horizontal behavior must be distinguished from vertical
behavior and must continue to be evaluated under the per se
standard.290 This warning seems to be carrying some weight in the
lower courts.291 Lower courts have ensured that when there is
evidence of a horizontal agreement among competitors to fix prices
or eliminate competition, a per se standard is still appropriate.292
However, some courts have refused to extend the per se exception to
286. See id. at 191.
287. Id. at 191–92.
288. Id.
289. Sullivan & Linder, supra note 266, at 71.
290. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007).
291. See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir.
2008); Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461 (E.D.
Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008).
292. See Mack, 530 F.3d at 225; Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *4–6.
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vertical restraints unless an explicit horizontal agreement exists.293
This poses a problem for plaintiffs because oftentimes horizontal
agreements are unspoken.294 Additionally, courts sometimes choose
to ignore certain horizontal relationships.295 For instance, a
horizontal aspect emerges in the relationship between a manufacturer
and its retailers when the manufacturer chooses to sell its products
directly to consumers and through independent retailers, but courts
often find that this relationship does not warrant a per se approach.296
Moreover, at least one court has refused to use the per se rule even
when a manufacturer imposes vertical restraint for the sole purpose
of strengthening illegal horizontal cartels.297
In deciding to dismiss Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc., the Eastern District of Tennessee rejected Spahr’s
assertion that the per se rule should apply because Leegin, as a
distributor of its own products, had engaged in horizontal price
fixing.298 Spahr’s argument was that because Leegin was a retailer of
its own products, it should be viewed as a horizontal competitor to its
independent retailers and thereby as a participant in a horizontal
conspiracy to fix prices.299 Citing the Sixth Circuit case International
Logistics Group, Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp.,300 the court stated that
businesses operating under a dual-distribution system301 do not open
themselves up to horizontal liability when imposing restraints on
independent distributors.302 The court found that no horizontal
scheme existed because antitrust laws do not prohibit businesses
from selling their own products while simultaneously utilizing
independent retailers, and Spahr had demonstrated no other evidence

293. Mack, 530 F.3d at 220–21; Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *3–4.
294. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 627.
295. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1235–36.
296. Id. at 1236.
297. Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *4.
298. Id. at *4, *15.
299. Id. at *5.
300. 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.1989).
301. In other words, a manufacture simultaneously distributes its own products to consumers
directly and through other independent distributors. Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *6 (stating that
a dual distributor is a manufacturer who “operates a branch of dealership on the same market
level as one or more of its customers” (citation omitted)).
302. Id.
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of horizontal collusion.303 Consequently, the court applied the rule of
reason.304
Likewise, the Third Circuit found the rule of reason was the
appropriate standard in Toledo Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. Mack
Trucks, Inc.,305 despite recognizing the likelihood that a truck
manufacturer’s sole purpose for entering into agreements with its
dealers was to support an agreement among the dealers not to
compete.306 One of Mack’s dealers refused to comply with the terms
of the agreement that limited the dealer to distributing trucks inside
an assigned geographic territory.307 The dealer alleged that the only
reason Mack implemented the territorial restrictions was to support
an agreement between its dealers to fix prices by agreeing not to
compete with one another.308 The Third Circuit explained that it
would evaluate the agreement among the dealers according to the per
se rule because the agreement involved collusion among horizontal
competitors to set prices,309 but it also explained that the agreements
between Mack and its dealers would be subject to the rule of
reason.310 The Third Circuit, citing Leegin, stated that “the rule of
reason analysis applies [to vertical agreements] even when . . . the
plaintiff alleges that the purpose of the vertical agreement between a
manufacturer and its dealers is to support illegal horizontal
agreements between multiple dealers.”311
As shown in the case law above, although the Leegin Court
rejected the per se rule for all vertical restraints, plaintiffs have
identified an approach that allows them to utilize the rule by proving
that a vertical restraint is merely a pretext for a horizontal
agreement.312 This technique has offered some success to plaintiffs
alleging that vertical restraints constitute antitrust violations.
Nonetheless, this has not saved vertical restraints from per se legality
because courts are reluctant, as seen in Spahr and Mack, to
overextend this exception to all situations that exhibit both vertical
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *7–8.
530 F.3d 204, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 218–19.
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 218–19.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Sullivan & Linder, supra note 266, at 70.
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and horizontal undercurrents unless there is unambiguous evidence
of horizontal conspiracy. In effect, this has limited the number of
situations in which pleading horizontal conspiracy is a viable
strategy for plaintiffs, and as vertical enforcement continues its
decline into per se legality under the rule of reason, serious
implications arise if illegal horizontal conduct is masquerading as
vertical conduct.
C. Hitting the Wall:
Plaintiffs’ Difficulty
Overcoming Economic Analyses
For the few plaintiffs fortunate enough to survive the pleading
stages of an antitrust claim, the challenge is far from over. In order to
win an antitrust claim under the rule of reason, the plaintiff must first
convince the court that the anticompetitive consequences of the
restraint outweigh the procompetitive benefits.313 When determining
whether the plaintiff has met this burden the court must undertake an
in-depth economic analysis of the restraint, the relevant market, and
the industry as a whole.314 A constantly evolving economic market
and ever-changing business realities complicate economic
analyses.315 Courts cannot employ a bright-line rule because the
economy is so dynamic that the impact of a restriction can vary
immensely within a particular market over time.316
The fact that the strength of antitrust enforcement has fluctuated
with the political climate of the time further complicates the
precision of courts’ economic analyses.317 Much to the dismay of
antitrust scholars, political biases have, over time, led courts to
become less suspicious of vertical restraints’ anticompetitive
effects.318 This decrease in skepticism, in conjunction with the
313. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385–86.
314. Id.
315. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1600–10 (discussing the impact that the
advent of the internet has had on doing business).
316. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 905 (2007). The Court
explained that it is important that “our antitrust doctrines ‘evolve with new circumstances and
new wisdom.’” Id. (citation omitted).
317. See PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
318. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 877; see also Saami Zain, Quanta
Leap or Much Ado About Nothing? An Analysis on the Effect of Quanta v. LG Electronics, 20
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 67, 115 (2010) (“In recent times, however, courts and commentators have
grown less suspicious of vertical restraints, and specifically, whether they are likely to be
anticompetitive.”).
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Supreme Court’s concern for producing too many false positives,319
prompted the Court to switch from per se illegality to the rule of
reason in Sylvania and Leegin.320 But recently, skepticism has
surfaced as to whether courts are able to properly weigh the
competitive impact of vertical restraints under the rule of reason. If,
in practice, the courts never find that anticompetitive effects
outweigh procompetitive justifications, a real concern arises that
courts are not conducting proper economic analyses.
1. Operating on Uncertainty:
Can Courts Properly
Evaluate Economic Impact?
The courts’ ability to conduct an accurate economic analysis and
correctly predict how business practices will influence competition is
essential to effective antitrust enforcement.321 In Leegin, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that the lower courts did not have adequate
experience weighing the procompetitive and anticompetitive impacts
of resale price maintenance.322 In fact, the Court implied that this
was one of its primary reasons for overturning the per se standard
and implementing the rule of reason instead.323 In order to conduct
an effective economic analysis, courts must possess “the ability to
understand, apply, and explain microeconomics and industrial
organization theory . . . to . . . specific real-world situation[s].”324
Unfortunately, courts typically are not equipped with the skills
needed to identify the actual economic impact, and the nature of the
adversarial system only complicates matters more so.325

319. A false positive occurs when a court finds conduct that does not actually harm
competition to be anticompetitive. False positives typically arise as the result of over enforcement
and per se rules. See Wright, supra note 16, at 3 n.10 (stating that an example of a false positive
would be when a firm is falsely accused of an antitrust violation); see also Harbour, supra note
29, at 15 (referring to false positives as “Type I” errors).
320. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1407–08.
321. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Improving Competitive Analysis, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 805,
805–06 (2009).
322. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 894–98.
323. See id.
324. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806.
325. Id. (“[J]udges are almost never appointed based on their credentials as
microeconomists.”); see also Stucke, supra note 10, at 1440 (“Weighing a particular restraint’s
competitive benefits and harms, however, is often beyond the litigants’, [and] the judiciary’s . . .
capacity.”).
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a. Complications in appraising
the value of a restraint’s
procompetitive justifications
Over time, courts have accumulated limited experience in
performing accurate economic and competitive analyses but have not
fully developed the ability to understand real-world markets or
predict future competitive effects.326 Indeed, as one antitrust scholar
noted:
Economists, much less judicial fact-finders, are ill-equipped
to quantify the value of different forms of competition, such
as inter- and intrabrand competition, static versus dynamic
efficiency, and a restraint’s impact on that competition.
Even if such weighing were feasible, no consensus exists on
the relative weights for each factor. In certain industries,
society may seek to promote innovation (dynamic
efficiency) more than lower prices (static efficiency).
Moreover, the weighing ignores the distributional effects of
the challenged restraint . . . [because] the fact-finder does
not consider whether one group bears the brunt of
anticompetitive effects over time.327
Partly, this inexperience can be attributed to the fact that earlier
antitrust cases rarely required such an in-depth economic analysis as
is presently required.328 Further, courts have dismissed many cases
for failure to state a claim before they have actually performed an
economic analysis, and in the few cases that survive motions to
dismiss, the parties often settle before the court conducts its
analysis.329 Additionally, courts have not explicated which policy
considerations should trump others when weighing a restraint’s
effects on competition.330
If courts are overvaluing the procompetitive benefits and
undervaluing the anticompetitive harms of vertical restraints, there is
a real concern that they are not balancing the competitive impacts
accurately. In particular, courts may be giving too much weight to
arguments that vertical restraints are permissible because they have
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806.
Stucke, supra note 10, at 1442.
Lipsky, supra note 321, at 805–06.
Id. at 805; see discussion supra Part III.A.
See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1441.
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the potential to promote interbrand competition and combat free
riders.331 If these justifications are not as persuasive as the Court has
deemed, the rule of reason is groundlessly excusing anticompetitive
restraints.
i. Undervaluing the benefit
of intrabrand competition
Traditionally, economists have neglected to investigate the
competitive significance of intrabrand competition.332 The Supreme
Court has openly proclaimed that promoting interbrand, and not
intrabrand, competition is the “primary concern of antitrust law.”333
The result seems to be that courts have chosen to overlook the
consequences that arise from limiting intrabrand competition based
on the assumption that the increase in interbrand competition is more
desirable.334 But this apathy toward intrabrand competition may be
misguided, and eliminating intrabrand competition may not be as
benign as economists have conventionally believed.335
Intrabrand competition encourages entities at the same level of
distribution to compete for sales margins and market shares, which
eventually leads to lower prices for consumers.336 This is not to say
that the need for intrabrand competition will always negate an
increase in interbrand competition, but it is certainly a consideration
that courts need to delve into more deeply than they have in the
superficial investigations they have conducted in the past.337 A
blanket statement that interbrand competition outweighs intrabrand
competition is dangerous because it distracts courts from evaluating
the actual market impact of intrabrand competition.

331. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 11–14 (explaining how the Chicago School’s views often
undervalue or ignore the anticompetitive effects of eliminating intrabrand competition); Lao,
supra note 165, at 512 (questioning the extent of the free-rider problem).
332. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 10–11.
333. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (citing Cont’l T.
V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)).
334. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895–96 (2007);
Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724–25; Cont’l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 51–52 & 52 n.19.
335. Harbour, supra note 29, at 13–14.
336. Id. at 4–5, 12.
337. See id. at 11.
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ii. Overestimating the
prevalence of free riding
Likewise, procompetitive justifications that vertical restraints
fight free riders may be as blindly glorified as the importance of
interbrand competition.338 When purchasing goods, consumers often
value, and are prepared to pay more for, services such as in-store
salespersons, live dealer demonstrations, and attractive storefronts.339
Therefore, manufacturers usually desire that their retailers provide
those additional services to customers during the sale of their
products, and, in turn, their retailers charge consumers higher
prices.340 Free riding occurs when, after using one retailer’s services,
consumers ultimately purchase the product at a lower price from
another retailer who does not provide those services.341 For example,
a consumer may go to an expensive retail store offering live
demonstrations to research a product but then go to a discount
warehouse to purchase it. In this example, the warehouse would be
“free riding” on the services provided by the retail store. Free riding
is a problem because it eliminates retailers’ incentive to offer the
services altogether.342 In the end, consumers and manufacturers
suffer because retailers cease to offer the services or discontinue the
sale of the product.343
Proponents of vertical price fixing are adamant that it decreases
the prevalence of free riding.344 Resale price fixing ensures that a
discount retailer—the free rider—does not undercut the price of a
retailer selling the same product and offering additional services,
thereby eliminating the motivation for consumers to buy the product
from the discount retailer.345 However, many economists oppose this
argument, and there is virtually no empirical evidence demonstrating
that free riding is as rampant as the supporters of vertical price fixing
claim.346 In fact, free riding may materialize only in the sale of
expensive or complex products—products that require some sort of
338. Lao, supra note 165, at 478–79.
339. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1606–07.
340. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608–09.
341. See, e.g., Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1614–15.
342. Id. at 1607.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 1606.
345. See, e.g., id. at 1607.
346. Lao, supra note 165, at 478–79 (citing to, among others, antitrust scholars Robert
Pitofsky, Kevin Arquit, and Stanley Ornstein).
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interaction with a salesperson.347 Yet there are a multitude of
everyday products that do not require services of any sort and, as
such, are not susceptible to free riding but remain subject to price
maintenance nonetheless.348 If economists cannot agree about the
extent of free riding or whether it is actually a legitimate reason for
restraining trade, how can we expect the courts to make a judgment
call about its impact?
b. Battling experts, high costs,
and other deficiencies of
the adversarial system
To complicate matters even more, the lower courts have been
exposed to economic analysis only in the context of adversarial
proceedings.349 During litigation, parties present customers and
documents that support their position with respect to the challenged
restraint.350 Furthermore, “motivated advocates,” including lawyers
and experts, assert economic theories supporting their position with
“towering confidence,” often forgoing unbiased reflection and
impartial explanations.351
When courts are asked to determine a restraint’s impact on
competition, they typically turn to “neoclassical economic theories,”
which are based upon the assumption that “profit-maximizing market
participants pursue their economic self-interest with perfect
knowledge and willpower.”352 Unfortunately, actual behavior rarely
coincides with theoretical behavior.353 Individuals do not have a
“perfect knowledge” of economics, and no single definition of
perfect competition exists because it varies so greatly across different
product markets.354 Because of the disparity among economists, the
trials result in a “battle of the experts,”355 as the parties retain experts
to demonstrate the so-called actual impact of the challenged
347. Id. at 479 (giving examples of advanced audio and video equipment as a complex
products).
348. Id. at 479–80 (describing products that do not require services but remain subject to price
fixing to include “boxed candy, pet foods, jeans, vitamins, shampoo, [etc]”).
349. See Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806.
350. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1427.
351. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806.
352. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1426.
353. Id. at 1426–27.
354. Id.
355. Kelly, supra note 4, at 640.
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restraint.356 However, this approach carries some serious infirmities.
First, these experts rarely have practical work experience in the
industry at issue and thus base their testimonies not on actual
business realities but on theoretical economics.357 Furthermore, the
court is then asked to evaluate each party’s skewed position based on
only its basic and limited understanding of economics to determine
which theory it believes is more likely to be accurate.358
Of course, the trial judge can mitigate the potential for error by
scrutinizing an expert’s testimony before it is presented to ensure that
it has a reliable foundation and is relevant to the economic
analysis.359 However, “judges are almost never appointed based on
their credentials as microeconomists” and their understanding of
valid economic theories is limited.360 Additionally, judges are often
able to dictate the outcome of a case being decided under the rule of
reason by relying on their subjective biases.361 Granting judges the
ability to foreclose or insist upon the admittance of expert testimony
only augments their tendency to “jealously guard their
prerogative[s]” by allowing them to decide what theories will be
entertained at trial.362 In this way, judges may exclude from
consideration any testimony that would be contrary to their
interests.363 Thus, judges may not be able to adequately fulfill their
role as gatekeepers in antitrust cases.
Another obstacle that plaintiffs commonly encounter with the
judicial system is the high cost of litigation.364 The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that antitrust cases are particularly protracted and
expensive, especially when the rule of reason applies.365 This is

356. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1427.
357. Id.
358. Kelly, supra note 4, at 640; Stucke, supra note 10, at 1427.
359. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
360. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806.
361. See supra Part III.C.3.
362. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in
Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 621 (2005).
363. Id.
364. Kelly, supra note 4, at 636.
365. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1461–62 (citing to Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 558–59 (2007); Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
289 (1985); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)); see also Kelly,
supra note 4, at 636 (explaining that because discovery and other pre-trial costs are extremely
expensive in rule of reason cases, plaintiffs are often prompted to forgo filing a suit altogether or
to settle early on).

1272

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1225

directly attributable to the fact-intensive nature of the economic
analysis required by the rule of reason.366 The high cost of litigation
causes some anxiety because, as one scholar noted, “if it is too costly
to vindicate one’s legal rights, the law is majestic in theory, but
impractical in reality.”367 Consequently, plaintiffs will think twice
about pursuing a suit when they perceive that the costs will outweigh
the benefits, causing an already wavering level of enforcement to
plummet even further.368
2. Picking and Choosing:
The Court Recognizes Change,
but Ignores Reality
Since the Sherman Act’s inception in 1890, business practices
have changed, perhaps most significantly due to the emergence of
the Internet and discount wholesaler chains.369 While the Court in
Leegin did not directly address why courts could not perform an
adequate competitive analysis, the underlying theme was that
because the economic realities have changed dramatically over the
last century, the anticompetitive harm was no longer as apparent as it
once had been.370 The Court, however, neglected to consider how
these constantly evolving economic and business dynamics might
only further confuse courts about how to conduct an accurate
economic analysis. It is thus necessary to understand how these
changes impact business before evaluating their effects on courts’
economic analyses.
a. Emergence of the Internet
There is no doubt that the Internet has changed the way that
people do business. Businesses have increasingly relied on the
Internet to conduct day-to-day operations, including advertising,
customer services, sales transactions, and communications.371
Between 2002 and 2007, Internet sales increased by over 23 percent
each year while total retail sales increased by only 5 percent each
366. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1462.
367. Id. at 1460.
368. See id.
369. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1600–01.
370. See id.
371. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS: E-COMMERCE 2009 1 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf.
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year.372 The Internet is particularly appealing to consumers because
they are no longer constrained to shopping during store hours or to
purchasing from retailers within their geographic locations.373 As a
result, they have greater access to more shopping options than ever
before.374 Accordingly, consumers have more opportunities to obtain
lower prices or purchase unusual goods.375
Nevertheless, the Internet has become one of the most
troublesome issues for businesses seeking to impose vertical
restrictions today.376 Specifically, the Internet poses new and
worrisome challenges to manufacturers due to the ease with which
consumers can access pricing information for competing goods.377
Internet retailers are more often thought to free ride on brick-andmortar retailers because they have lower overhead costs, offer lower
prices, and generally do not offer the same services that brick-andmortar stores do.378 As a result, the accessibility provided by the
Internet is a major reason why vertical price fixing has become a
more desirable business practice for manufacturers in recent years.379
While price is not consumers’ sole concern when making
purchases—picking trustworthy retailers has proven to be an
important consideration—Internet shoppers are particularly price
aware.380 Due to the availability of product information online,
consumers have changed their shopping habits.381 Today, consumers
often research products on the Internet before purchasing them from
a retail store.382 As a result, retail storefronts and customer service
have become less important to consumers’ decisions to purchase.383
Unfortunately for rivaling retailers, Internet accessibility enables
users to compare prices among retailers more easily, which has the

372. Lao, supra note 165, at 483.
373. Id. at 485–86.
374. See id.
375. Id. at 485. The lack of geographic restraints is particularly beneficial to “consumers
living in communities without sufficient population to support a robust local retail market” and
“buyers with less common needs.” Id.
376. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1601.
377. Id.
378. Lao, supra note 165, at 482.
379. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1601.
380. Id. at 1613–14.
381. Id.
382. Lao, supra note 165, at 493.
383. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1614.
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potential to harm competition in numerous ways.384 First, it can
cause an increase in free riders.385 Second, it can improve the ability
of retail cartel participants to monitor other cartel participants386
because price cutting becomes more obvious.387 Finally, it increases
the strength of horizontal relationships when manufacturers decide to
sell online instead of solely through retailers.388
The ease of comparing prices directly correlates to the
prevalence of free riding.389 The Internet encourages free riding
because consumers who desire a high level of customer service can
merely visit the brick-and-mortar store before returning home to
locate the lowest price among online retailers.390 Consumers are no
longer geographically constrained and can easily peruse numerous
retailers for the best deal without the hassle of driving from store to
store.391 However, the belief that the Internet encourages free riding
on brick-and-mortar retailers is controversial—and recent studies
have yielded results indicating that free riding is occurring in the
opposite direction more frequently.392 Due to the volume of
information accessible via the Internet, consumers may research a
product over the Internet before travelling to the brick-and-mortar
384. See id. at 1612.
385. Id. at 1612, 1615; see Lao, supra note 165, at 482.
386. “Cartels are associations of firms that restrict output or set prices. They may divide
markets geographically, allocate customers, rig bids at auctions, or restrict nonprice terms. They
have often been formed with the participation or support of state actors.” MARGARET C.
LEVENSTEIN & VALERIE Y. SUSLOW, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
387. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1612, 1617–18.
388. Id. at 1612, 1618–19.
389. Id. at 1615.
390. Id.
391. Lao, supra note 165, at 488–89.
392. Id. at 476. However, some economists believe that even if brick-and-mortar stores do
free ride on Internet retailers, the cost of free riding is more detrimental to brick-and-mortar
retailers than to online retailers. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1615–16
(explaining that Internet retailers have fixed costs while brick-and-mortar stores’ costs are
variable and depend on the cost of employing sales associates and the investment of maintaining
a physical storefront). This is because consumers are always forced to pay full price at brick-andmortar stores regardless of whether the consumer desires the services or benefits from the
services. See The Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act: Do We Need to Restore the Ban on
Vertical Price Fixing?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antirust, Competition Policy And
Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 141 (2010) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of James Wilson, Chairman, Antitrust Section of the Am. Bar Ass’n)
(explaining that “while some services may benefit consumers as well as manufacturers, other
services provide little or no benefit to consumers even though resale price maintenance can be
expected to elevate the price that some consumers pay”).
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store to purchase it.393 Research also indicates that free riding can be
synergistic—simultaneously benefitting both brick-and-mortar and
Internet retailers—in that as internet shoppers utilize the services of a
brick-and-mortar store, they create an appearance of a more crowded
store, which increases other shoppers’ desires to purchase a product
from that store and drives up the total sales of the store.394
Another concern with Internet accessibility is that the Internet
encourages an increase in manufacturer and retail cartels.395 An
essential feature of successful cartels is the ability to detect when
parties are not in compliance with the agreement.396 Because prices
are so readily available on the Internet, manufacturers and retailers
can monitor price cutting behavior almost effortlessly, thereby
increasing their ability to overesee retail and manufacturer cartels.397
A final concern is that the Internet encourages retail cartels to form
as manufacturers vertically integrate themselves into the chain of
distribution.398 Selling products via the Internet requires much fewer
capital and upkeep costs, and, therefore, manufacturers may find
establishing an Internet retail front to be a valuable business tactic.399
Once a manufacturer decides to sell through its own website, it can
engage in price fixing behavior with its retailers much more easily by
preventing them from making Internet sales or by requiring them to
sell at its set price.400
It is obvious that the Internet has changed the way people do
business, but how it has affected competition is unclear. Therefore,
how the courts should evaluate the impact the Internet has had on
vertical restraints in an economic analysis is not intuitive. The
Supreme Court could have addressed how the Internet might
influence an economic analysis in Leegin, but instead it chose to
leave this question unanswered—ensuring that the courts remain illequipped to weigh economic impacts.

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Lao, supra note 165, at 490–91.
Id. at 476.
Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1617.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1618.
See Lao, supra note 165, at 482; Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1611–12.
Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1618.
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b. Discount retailers’ dominance
In recent decades, the retail industry has been significantly
altered by the emergence of discount retailing and by the significant
rise in the prominence of discount retail chains,401 such as Wal-Mart,
Target, and Costco.402 Since the first discount store was established
in the 1950s, discount retailers have grown substantially and now
dominate the retail market.403 The public has been extremely
skeptical of the impact of these chains, and exactly how these
discount retailers have impacted the economy and competition is
uncertain.404 Studies demonstrate that when a chain store enters the
market, it renders roughly 50 percent of the single-firm discount
stores unprofitable.405 However, due to modeling difficulties, few
empirical studies have been able to establish the precise impact of
dominant retail chains.406
401. A discount retailer can be defined as “a departmentalized retail establishment that makes
use of self-service techniques to sell a large variety of hard goods and soft goods at uniquely low
margins.” Panle Jia, What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical Analysis of
the Discount Retailing Industry, 76 ECONOMETRICA 1263, 1264 (2008).
402. Id.
403. See id. at 1263–64; see also Company Dossier: Costco Wholesale Corporation,
LEXISNEXIS,
http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.linus.lmu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi=
AC02NBCmpDosSrch (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (stating that Costco is the largest wholesaleclub operator in the United States); Company Dossier: Target Corporation, LEXISNEXIS, http://0www.lexisnexis.com.linus.lmu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi=AC02NBCmpDosSrch (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011) (stating that Target is the United States’s second-top discount retail chain);
Company Dossier: Wal-Mart Stores Inc., LEXISNEXIS, http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.linus.lmu
.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi=AC02NBCmpDosSrch (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (stating
that Wal-Mart is the world’s top retailer).
404. See Jia, supra note 401, at 1264–65.
405. See id. at 1266. This can be attributed to a decline in customer demand for the higher
priced product. Raymond Deneckere et al., Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price
Maintenance, 11 Q. J. ECON. 885, 911 (1996). Discounters are able to charge lower prices
because they are less likely to be stuck with unsold merchandise. Id. As retailers lose customers
to discount retailers, they are forced to increase their markups, which inevitably leads to even
more unsold merchandise and basically destroys customer demand for the marked-up products.
Id.
406. Jia, supra note 401, at 1265. “‘[A] mathematical model is a description of a process or a
prediction about the end result of a process, expressed as an equation’ or set of equations.”
Matthew W. Swinehart, Remedying Daubert’s Inadequacy in Evaluating the Admissibility of
Scientific Models Used in Environmental-Tort Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2008)
(quoting ORRIN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS, USELESS ARITHMETIC: WHY
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENTISTS CAN'T PREDICT THE FUTURE 24 (2007)). When there are too many
variables in an equation, it becomes impossible to get an answer; therefore, if economists want to
quantify economic impact through algorithms, they often have to make assumptions that cause
certain variables to remain constant. Id. at 1288–93. However, these assumptions usually do not
reflect real market conditions, and as a result, they can yield erroneous, sometimes even useless,
numerical results. Id. The term “modeling difficulties” refers to these inaccuracies. Id.
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If economists cannot pinpoint the impact that these retail chains
are having on businesses, courts certainly are not better suited to
making that determination. Yet, once again, the Supreme Court
overlooked this problem, refused to identify how it might influence
courts’ analyses under the rule of reason, and left lower courts to find
their own solutions.407 Furthermore, because the Court realized that
the lowers courts would likely be confused when evaluating the
impact of retail chains, it cannot use its ignorance as an excuse for its
failure to provide a framework for incorporating that impact into an
economic analysis. In fact, during oral argument in Leegin, Justice
Scalia acknowledged that discount retailers could be concerned with
suffering from the economic implications of switching from per se
illegality to the rule of reason.408 However, Justice Scalia quickly,
and perhaps misguidedly, dismissed this as a nonissue because, in his
own words, if the discount retailers had a real gripe, “they would
have been here.”409
The Supreme Court was clearly correct when it said that both
the economy and the way people conduct business have evolved
since the Sherman Act’s inception in 1890. However, when the Court
defaulted to the rule of reason without providing additional guidance
about how to conduct an appropriate economic analysis in light of
these changes, it made a costly error—one that vertical-restraint
plaintiffs are still paying for.
3. It All Comes Down to Politics:
Subjective Bias as the Deciding Factor
Washington defines antitrust policy in two ways: the first is by
interpreting and providing guidance on the laws made by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), and the second is by enforcing cases filed by the DOJ and

407. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
408. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1459.
409. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 967030, at *31–32). Scalia noted that discount
retailers—the Wal-Marts and the Targets—did not file amicus briefs and claimed that if they
were really concerned about losing profits they would have petitioned as amici. Id. This comment
raises an additional concern in that Justice Scalia seems to be encouraging rent seeking in future
cases by stating that if businesses decline to petition the Court when their profitability is at issue
in a case, they are essentially disclaiming any adverse economic impact. Id. at 1457–60
(discussing concerns of an increase in rent seeking behavior under the rule of reason).
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FTC.410 In addition, because the president appoints DOJ prosecutors
and FTC commissioners,411 a change in presidential administration
can greatly influence antitrust enforcement, which is usually clear
from the cases that the different administrations bring—or fail to
bring.412 This strong political influence creates a concern that an
administration may not implement the laws faithfully because it has
too much discretion to decide what conduct will be prohibited or
permitted.413 Thus, an administration’s failure to enforce certain
restraints can contribute to a standard of per se legality.
Different administrations have used antitrust enforcement to
promote their own political objectives since the Reagan
administration, when enforcement politics began to infiltrate
enforcement schemes.414 Before Reagan took office, the Republican
Party predominantly endorsed antitrust enforcement, as reflected by
the continuity with which the Republican and Democratic
administrations had previously enforced the antitrust laws.415 During
the Reagan administration, however, the Republican Party departed
from “overbearing regulation,” and antitrust enforcement waned.416
Under Reagan, the government actively pursued actions to eliminate
predatory competitive pricing and price gouging but never
prosecuted any vertical restraint or monopoly cases. 417 The
Republican Party has maintained the laissez-faire attitude it adopted
during the Reagan administration through the Bush Administration
until today and, at times, has even been accused of abandoning
antitrust enforcement altogether given its lax enforcement policies.418
When George W. Bush took office, he promised to enforce
antitrust laws as forcefully as the Clinton administration had.419 This
410. See Stephen Labaton, Obama Takes Tougher Antitrust Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/business/economy/12antitrust.html?pagewanted=all.
411. About the Office, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/about-oag.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2011); Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/
commissioners/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
412. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1448–50.
413. Id. at 1450–51.
414. Id. at 1448–51.
415. Id. at 1450 n.324, 1451 n.326.
416. See id. at 1450 n.324.
417. Id. at 1452. The sole exception was a monopoly case against AT&T, which the Reagan
administration settled in 1982. Id.; see United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982).
418. Id. at 1452–54 & n.337.
419. Id. at 1452–53.
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proclamation, however, proved to be a sham.420 Contrary to President
Bush’s assertion, merger enforcement declined by over 50 percent,
and the DOJ did not prosecute a single monopoly case against a
dominant firm during his administration.421 This caused great
dissatisfaction among the “press, antitrust scholars, politicians, and
practitioners.”422 One antitrust scholar even commented that the
Bush Administration’s guidelines for enforcement were a “brief for
defendants.”423 As previously noted, this statement has proven to be
somewhat accurate as defendants rarely, if ever, lost antitrust cases
judged according to the rule of reason during the Bush
Administration.424 Furthermore, it was under President Bush’s
administration that the Court took the final step in relaxing vertical
enforcement by extending the rule of reason to vertical price
fixing.425 When antitrust enforcement seriously favors defendants,
inadvertently defaulting to per se legality becomes a real concern.
Now with President Obama at the helm, antitrust enforcement
agencies seem to be taking a tougher stance on anticompetitive
practices. The discrepancy between the different political agendas of
the Bush and Obama administrations and its impact on antitrust
enforcement may be most apparent in the actions taken by the DOJ
when Obama took office. In 2008, at the end of the Bush
Administration, the DOJ issued guidelines on how to enforce
predatory conduct by dominant firms.426 The guidelines
memorialized the Bush Administration’s approach to enforcement427
and were condemned by the FTC as “a blueprint for radically
weakened enforcement.”428 Then, only a few months after the DOJ

420. Id. at 1453.
421. Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust
Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential
%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf; see also Labaton, supra note 410
(“During the Bush Administration, the Justice Department did not file a single case against a
dominant firm for violating the antimonopoly law.”).
422. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1453–54 & n.337–40.
423. Labaton, supra note 410 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp).
424. Lao, supra note 165, at 508. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
425. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (subjecting
all vertical restraints to a rule of reason analysis).
426. Steven Pearlstein, Antitrust Challenges for the Obama Administration, WASH. POST
(May 17, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/15/
AR2009051502920.html.
427. Labaton, supra note 410 (quoting an unnamed FTC commissioner).
428. Id.
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implemented the guidelines, the Obama administration took over the
executive branch, and the DOJ rescinded those very guidelines.429
Currently, the Obama administration has maintained the level of
enforcement that the Bush Administration claimed it would
pursue.430 The resurgence of enforcement under Obama is based on
the belief that the Bush Administration disregarded the ultimate
goals of antitrust law by implementing a policy that “effectively
straightjacket[ed]” antitrust enforcement agencies and courts trying
to rectify antitrust injuries, thereby allowing all but the “most bold
and predatory conduct” to go unregulated.431 The Obama
administration has voiced a particular concern with this approach in
light of the recent economic downturn and the importance of
vigorously enforcing antitrust laws during economic crises.432 Up to
this point, Obama’s administration has demonstrated an attitude
geared toward revamping vertical enforcement as well.433 It has
voiced its support for legislation aimed at overturning Leegin and
reverting to the per se treatment of minimum vertical price fixing.434
While the extent to which the change in the presidential
administration will strengthen vertical enforcement is still unclear,
Obama has indicated a commitment to a more rigorous approach
than that taken under President Bush, which may help to save
vertical price fixing from per se legality.435
However, the executive branch is not the only branch of
government that makes decisions based upon its political platforms,
and thus plaintiffs should remain wary when seeking private
enforcement.436 Courts, including the Supreme Court, are not
isolated from partisanship: Supreme Court justices are appointed by
the executive branch and generally support their party’s political
platforms during their tenure.437 Increasingly, business lobbyists are
429. Pearlstein, supra note 426.
430. Labaton, supra note 410 (discussing how Obama’s “new enforcement policy reverses the
Bush administration’s approach”).
431. Id. (quoting Christine Varney, former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice).
432. Id.
433. Quentin R. Wittrock & Jeremy L. Johnson, Can Franchisors Control Franchisee
Prices?, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 199, 243 (2009).
434. Id.
435. See id. at 243–44.
436. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1456.
437. See id. at 1457 n.356.
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becoming less concerned with changing legislation, choosing instead
to turn their efforts toward influencing the courts.438 In addition,
vague standards, like the rule of reason, allow judges to introduce
their personal ideological and political beliefs into antitrust
analyses.439
A survey of Supreme Court justices’ voting decisions between
1937 and 2006 revealed that Republican-appointed justices
consistently voted more conservatively than Democratic-nominated
justices.440 This trend shows no sign of changing, as more-recent
appointees have demonstrated an even greater propensity for voting
according to their political ideologies.441 At the conclusion of the
2007–2008 term, one commentator noticed that the Supreme Court
followed the example set during recent terms and “once again sided
in most cases with employers over employees, with big businesses
over consumers, and with the government over individuals.”442 Then
in 2010 another commentator noted that, in the previous six years,
the Supreme Court had “become critical (or even somewhat hostile)
to antitrust, having decided [only] eight antitrust cases—all having
the effect of [further] weakening antitrust enforcement.”443 While
this deterioration of antitrust enforcement is disquieting for plaintiffs,
even more alarming is the fact that the Supreme Court heard eighteen
antitrust cases during the sixteen years between 1993 and 2009 and
did not rule for the plaintiff in a single one.444
As demonstrated above, the executive branch has the ability to
dictate the level of antitrust enforcement through appointments to the
FTC, DOJ, and judiciary, and therefore, an administration’s political
platforms can have serious repercussions on plaintiffs’ chances of
prevailing under the antitrust laws.445 Thus, de facto per se legality of
vertical restraints seems more likely to occur under a Republican
administration, like President Bush’s, than a Democratic
438. Id. at 1457.
439. Id. at 1456.
440. Id. at 1457 n.356.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 1458 (quoting Andrew Cohen, Not Your Father’s Court: Andrew Cohen Reviews
the Decisions and Looks at Trends from the Past Supreme Court Term, CBS NEWS (July 2,
2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/02/opinion/courtwatch/main4227922.shtml.
443. Zain, supra note 318, at 115. Leegin was one of these cases. See Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2006).
444. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1458.
445. See supra notes 410–444 and accompanying text.
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administration, like Obama’s. Unfortunately, although it seems
plaintiffs can take some solace in the Obama administration’s
resolution to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement, the courts have yet
to entirely adopt this sentiment, and thus, per se legality remains a
concern.
Collectively, the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a clearer
standard by which to conduct a competitive analysis, its ignorance of
the constantly evolving economic and political climates, and the
inherent deficiencies of the adversarial system have caused courts to
consistently yield unpredictable results when applying the rule of
reason.446 At least once, the Court itself recognized the high
likelihood that the rule of reason would produce inconsistent results:
[A]ntitrust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits throughout the
Nation in dozens of different courts with different
nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries. In light of
the nuanced nature of the evidentiary evaluations necessary
to separate the permissible from the impermissible, it will
prove difficult for those many different courts to reach
consistent results. And, given the fact-related nature of
many such evaluations, it will also prove difficult to assure
that the different courts evaluate similar fact patterns
consistently. The result is an unusually high risk that
different courts will evaluate similar factual circumstances
differently.447
And the outcome of an economic analysis is not the only
inconsistency under the rule of reason: courts differ as to how many
steps exist for establishing liability, how encompassing those steps
are, and which litigant shoulders the burden of proving them.448
Additionally, some courts require plaintiffs to definitively identify
the relevant market early on, while others bypass this requirement if
446. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1620.
447. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 (2007); Stucke, supra
note 10, at 1423.
448. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1432; see also Kelly, supra note 4, at 637 (“[I]t is not perfectly
clear what criteria the court must use to judge a practice under the rule [of] reason, how each
criterion should be judged, or how much weight to give each criterion considered.”); id. at 637
n.331 (explaining that different requirements for demonstrating market power exist among the
federal circuit courts); see, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd.
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (11th
Cir. 1996); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the plaintiff can prove an actual harm to competition.449 Obviously,
inconsistencies in the law pose significant concerns for businesses
and plaintiffs alike in that it is very difficult to determine antitrust
liability prior to litigation.450 As former President Woodrow Wilson
once explained, “Nothing hampers business like uncertainty.”451
Because the economy is not stagnant, the Court deferred to the
rule of reason, believing it to be a standard flexible enough to
account for economic changes.452 But when the Court neglected to
explain how to perform an objective economic analysis, it failed to
gauge the harm that allowing lower courts to incorporate their
subjective biases into analyses would have on enforcement levels.
Thus, while the Court may have intended the rule of reason to protect
competitive ideals by reacting reflexively to economic progress, it
has inadvertently created a standard that does not react to
anticompetitive practices at all—per se legality.
IV. THE COURT HAS HIT THE
SNOOZE BUTTON FOR LONG ENOUGH:
IT IS TIME TO AWAKEN VERTICAL ENFORCEMENT
By upholding the rule of reason for vertical enforcement, the
Court refuses to acknowledge the probability that vertical restraints
tend to injure competition, whether it be by eliminating intrabrand
competition or by leading to horizontal collusion. In doing so, the
Court also ignores its own proclamation in Leegin—that the lower
courts are ill-equipped to sufficiently perform an economic analysis.
Why, then, did the Court endorse a standard that not only requires
but also relies entirely upon an economic analysis?
As courts become progressively more reluctant to find that the
anticompetitive effects of a restraint outweigh the procompetitive
benefits, plaintiffs’ successes will continue to dwindle.453
Accordingly, it may only be a matter of time before plaintiffs
recognize that the cost of litigating vertical restraint cases is not
449. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1432–33; see also Kelly, supra note 4, at 637 (explaining that
there is a legal division about whether plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate a defendant’s
market power).
450. Stucke, supra note 10, 1422–23.
451. Id. at 1396 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, U.S. President, Address to Joint Session of
Congress on Trusts & Monopolies (Jan. 20, 1914), (transcript available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65374).
452. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
453. See supra Part III.C.1.a.
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worth the risk, thus prompting vertical enforcement to completely
succumb to a de facto rule of per se legality.454 To avoid this fate, the
Supreme Court must reevaluate the rule of reason’s construction and
provide a more definitive standard for analyzing vertical restraints.
This is not to say that the Court should return to a rule of per se
illegality. Rather, the Court should evaluate the problems that both
the rule of reason and the per se standards have exposed and, instead,
endorse a new standard that would avoid those same infirmities and
allow vertical enforcement to resume an optimum level.
After accounting for the infirmities of the current standard of
analysis, the Supreme Court should invoke a rebuttable presumption
of per se illegality for all vertical restraints. Inherent in this standard
would be a rebuttable presumption of market power as well. This
standard forsakes the traditional approach to categorization and
instead refocuses the courts’ attention on the effect of a restraint.455
While some may be skeptical of the impact that this standard will
have on precedent, evoking this new standard does not render all of
the antitrust precedent worthless. Rather, it merely recalibrates the
weight that courts should give to such precedent—categorization will
be used as a tool in performing an economic analysis instead of being
used to determine if an analysis is necessary.
A rebuttable presumption would still require that a plaintiff
sufficiently plead the existence of an agreement restraining
competition, but once this initial burden is satisfied, the complaint
would carry the assumption that the restraint is unreasonable.456 A
defendant would then be able to refute the plaintiff’s allegation of an
antitrust violation by proffering evidence that procompetitive
justifications excuse the restraint before a court decides if the
practice is anticompetitive.457 At this stage of analysis, courts would
be free to consider the categorical analysis that currently exists:
restraints which have long been recognized as procompetitive should
require the defendant to produce less evidence of reasonableness,
while those more controversial restraints should be evaluated based
upon their actual effect and not an arbitrary designation.458 In doing
454. See supra notes 359–363 and accompanying text.
455. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 644–45.
456. See Lao, supra note 165, at 511.
457. Kelly, supra note 4, at 644–45.
458. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1269 (explaining that categories can be helpful to
an economic analysis but should not be dispositive of the outcome).
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so, courts should assign less deference to practices that rouse
horizontal sentiments, such as price fixing, dual distribution, or those
that strengthen cartels, but should consider practices that have long
been viewed as beneficial to competition, such as vertical nonprice
restraints, more leniently.459 The upshot is that although categories
may still factor into a court’s analysis, the emphasis on
categorization will have shifted from being the utmost priority to
being one of many factors a court can utilize to predict the actual
economic impact of the restraint.
An additional feature of the new standard is a presumption of
that a manufacturer possesses market power. Market power is often
an important consideration in determining whether a practice is
anticompetitive.460 However, courts do not agree about how to apply
or whether to even consider market power in an economic analysis of
vertical restraints.461 The reality is that if a manufacturer has enough
influence to demand that its retailers consent to a price fixing
agreement, it must possess market power.462 Otherwise, the retailers
would refuse to comply.463
A. Categorization:
What Dreams Are Made of
or a Complete Nightmare?
Many scholars agree that the antitrust laws are outdated and
demand an overhaul, which would consist of abandoning passé
categorizations and assumptions and increasing reliance on empirical
evidence to develop a standard that is more relevant to the state of
the current economy.464 Particularly, scholars have argued that the
once rigid categories of analysis have been manipulated to the extent
that they fail to depict the current economic realities, and they worry
that “[b]lind reliance on the categories of yesteryear unnecessarily
complicates antitrust litigation, creates inaccurate results, and creates
perverse incentives for American businesses.”465
459. See id.
460. See Taralson, supra note 51, at 588–89.
461. See supra notes 448–449 and accompanying text.
462. Taralson, supra note 51, at 589.
463. See id.
464. E.g., Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1270; Kelly, supra note 4, at 646–47; see, e.g.,
Stucke, supra note 10, at 1490.
465. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1270.
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Further frustrating the current enforcement scheme is the weight
given to classifying restraints as horizontal or vertical, as price or
nonprice, and as illegal per se or subject to the rule of reason.466
Because categorization is often dispositive, plaintiffs always prefer
per se treatment while defendants argue that the rule of reason is
appropriate.467 One of the intrinsic problems with this categorical
characterization is that the courts, not the legislature, created the
categories and did so by manipulating “case-specific standards en
masse into categorical rules.”468 Unfortunately, the economic effect
of a restraint will vary under the different circumstances of every
case, and often, one type of restraint will, in reality, result in the
economic impact equivalent to a different type of restraint.469 Yet,
the courts do not consider the economic impact before selecting the
appropriate category,470 and courts are reluctant to reclassify vertical
restraints as horizontal even when they operationally result in the
same economic impacts as horizontal collusion.471 For example,
courts judge vertical price fixing according to the rule of reason even
if it tacitly leads to horizontal price fixing.472
If the Court would take note of this breakdown, it would
recognize the inherent flaws of the antitrust standards as they exist
today and would find the emphasis on categorical classification to be
counterproductive. Due to the variance in the economic impact of
restraints across markets, it is imprudent to create blanket categories
and strictly adhere to them.473 The Court claims that it recognizes the
danger of basing antitrust analysis on “formalistic line drawing,” but
nevertheless, that is precisely what it has done by creating and
emphasizing categorical distinctions.474 Effectively, because
classifying a restraint into a per se category is usually outcome
466.
467.
468.
469.

See id. at 1211.
See id. at 1219.
Id. at 1211.
See, e.g., LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLOCK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 4:20 (4th ed. 2007) (“[T]here are vertical agreements that
may have the same effect as a horizontal agreement.”).
470. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1225.
471. Id. at 1235–39 (explaining how dual distributorships do not fit into either category of
analysis due to their horizontal and vertical nature, yet courts still insist on classifying them and
judging them accordingly before considering their impact).
472. Supra Part III.B.3.
473. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1211–12.
474. Id. at 1237 (quoting Robert Zwirb, Dual Distribution and Antitrust Law, 21 LOY L.A. L.
REV. 1273, 1284 (1998)).
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determinative, the current enforcement scheme is faulty because it
inherently emphasizes the importance of classifying a restraint before
considering its actual economic impact. Without a doubt, courts
frequently devote more time to categorizing a restraint than to
determining its economic impact.475
While completely eliminating the per se rule and rule of reason
would be the most straightforward way to eliminate the problems
posed by categorical analysis, the Court is highly unlikely to
consider doing so given its current makeup. Most likely, the Court
would fear that it would essentially render all of our antitrust
precedent useless. Therefore, Congress may need to acknowledge the
problems inherent in the current enforcement scheme and take
matters into its own hands by passing a bill that changes the
standard. Given the unrest in Congress following Leegin’s
eradication of all per se illegal vertical restraints and the Court’s
long-standing tradition of outlawing only those restraints that
unreasonably restrict competition, a rebuttable presumption of
illegality would be a reasonable solution for the waning vertical
enforcement. A Congressional bill proposing this solution would
certainly be an easier sell to legislators than the bills currently urging
a return to per se illegality. Furthermore, as mentioned previously,
this approach will not erase all of our antitrust precedent; it will
merely recalibrate the influence it will have on the outcome of a
case.
B. Caffeine for the Court:
How a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality
Will Reenergize Vertical Enforcement
The primary deficiency of the per se rule was that it yielded too
many false positives.476 Even when procompetitive benefits resulted
from a vertical restraint on trade, the per se rule did not allow
defendants to offer any of them as justifications for imposing the
restraint.477 As a result, the Supreme Court has repeatedly voiced its
concern that the per se approach is inconsistent with its interpretation

475. See id. at 1211.
476. See id. at 1260.
477. See id.
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of the Sherman Act as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints.478
Similarly, the rule of reason is not flawless. As discussed previously,
the major drawbacks of the rule of reason are that it imposes an
extremely high burden on plaintiffs, promotes inconsistencies, and
allows courts to incorporate their own biases into their analyses.479
Collectively, these deficiencies create an even bigger problem for
enforcement by preventing plaintiffs from prevailing under the rule
of reason and, in so doing, creating a rule of per se legality. By
employing a rebuttable presumption of illegality, courts will be able
to resume an optimal level of vertical enforcement. A rebuttable
presumption of illegality will remedy four primary problems that the
current enforcement approach has exposed—accuracy, predictability,
objectivity, and applicability.
1. Increasing the
Accuracy of Rulings
First, a standard should yield accuracy so as to minimize
indications of anticompetitive behavior.480 Unfortunately, the current
enforcement scheme incentivizes plaintiffs and defendants to argue
for and create false positives and false negatives respectively. 481 The
problem with false positives is that restraints that actually promote
competition and consumer welfare are deemed to be illegal outright
due to their categorization.482 The result of underenforcement has
been criticized as leading to too few condemnations because conduct
harmful to competition and consumers too often goes undetected.483
The concern with too many false negatives under the rule of reason is
exacerbated by the fact that it has proven to operate as a de facto
pronouncement of per se legality on more than one occasion.484
Plaintiffs and defendants alike should be in a position to win antitrust
cases, and, as such, the economic impact should be outcome
determinative, not the categorization of the restraint.485 Accuracy
will reduce false indicators and encourage an optimal level of
478. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007);
Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977).
479. See supra notes 92–100, 359–363, 446–447 and accompanying text.
480. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1260–61.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 1261.
484. Lao, supra note 165, at 507–08.
485. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1265.
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enforcement—when a standard is accurate, courts can correctly
identify which restraints are adequately justified, and thus
reasonable, instead of judging a restraint based on its
categorization.486
Under the rebuttable-presumption approach, accuracy would
increase and courts could easily avoid false positives and negatives.
Unlike the per se standard, the rebuttable-presumption standard
allows the courts to consider the procompetitive justifications.
Additionally, in contrast to the rule of reason, it does not impose an
unfair burden on plaintiffs in the pleading stages—no longer would
plaintiffs be required to plead an unreasonable restraint on trade or
the defendant’s market power in their complaints. Perhaps most
importantly, it eliminates the possibility of miscategorization from
the outset. Courts would no longer have to agonize over
categorization before the economic analysis stage, and, even at that
point, the court would not be limited to putting the restraint in one
category. Instead, it would be free to consider multiple classifications
based on the circumstances of the case.
2. Improving Predictability
for Litigants
It is important that litigants are able to predict what test will be
applied during litigation.487 Uncertainty is unsavory to defendants
and plaintiffs alike.488 Businesses need to be able to predict their
antitrust liability before imposing a restraint, and plaintiffs should be
able to gauge the likelihood of success before filing a complaint.489
In order for a standard to be predictable, it must be both consistent
and transparent.
Inconsistency poses a problem because litigants should be able
to anticipate with some degree of certainty how the courts will regard
any given restraint. Currently, this is not possible because, due to the
Court’s broad grant of discretion in Leegin, different courts are
giving contradictory treatment to the same or similar restraints.490
Although the Court has prided itself on the flexibility of the

486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

See id. at 1260–61.
Stucke, supra note 10, at 1422–23.
See id. at 1422.
See id. at 1432–33.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).

1290

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1225

categorical standards, the Court’s ability to shift those categories on
a whim has led to widespread bewilderment for litigants attempting
to predict how the Court will rule.491 Moreover, as mentioned
previously, the Court can capriciously change the appropriate
category of a given restraint.492 If truth be told, the only thing courts
have been seemingly consistent about in recent times is finding no
antitrust violations in vertical-restraint cases.
It is also essential that the new standard be transparent so that
litigants are able to fully understand how the courts will apply it.493
Because of the Court’s grant of discretionary authority in Leegin,
courts are inconsistent in their application of the rule of reason.494
Leegin allows courts to develop their own methods for determining
whether a restraint is reasonable—with the only guiding principle
being that the procompetitive benefits must outweigh the
anticompetitive harms.495 The Court has not opined as to the role that
market power should play or the credence that courts should give to
advantageous and adverse economic impacts.496 This causes serious
concern for litigants because they are not sure what approach to take
when drafting their pleadings.497
Under a rebuttable-presumption standard, consistency and
transparency will improve because businesses and plaintiffs will
know which standard courts will apply, and they will be able to plan
accordingly. All litigants will be on notice that, once the pleading
burden is satisfied, the presumptions of unreasonableness and market
power will be imposed and each party will be granted the
opportunity to argue the merits of the case. Still, even under this
approach, consistency and transparency may continue to be a
concern because the courts will still be required to perform an
economic analysis after the defendant offers procompetitive
justifications. Under the current approach, however, courts do not
seem to be making any headway toward consistency or transparency;
thus, the rebuttable-presumption standard is at least a step in the right
direction. Since plaintiffs are consistently losing under the rule of
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1262–63.
Id.
See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1432–33.
See id.
See id. at 1385–86.
See id. at 1432–33 & nn.245–48.
See id.
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reason, a rebuttable presumption of illegality certainly offers to
improve those odds by giving plaintiffs more opportunity to argue
the economic impact of the restraint as opposed to its categorical
designation.
3. Forcing Courts to
Be More Objective
A third concern is objectivity. An effective standard should
require objectivity so that a court’s ability to incorporate its
subjective biases is as limited as possible.498 Political biases and
personal agendas inevitably make their way into a court’s analysis
when it applies vague standards.499 This is demonstrated by the
Court’s arbitrary creation of categorical analysis based on haphazard
distinctions.500 Instead of focusing on the economic effect of a
restraint, courts are able to favor parties and dictate outcomes by
arbitrarily lumping restraints into whichever category will yield the
desired result.501
Objectivity would improve under the proposed standard because
a presumption of unreasonableness would eliminate a court’s power
to inject a subjective opinion of what is reasonable from the outset of
litigation. Of course, defendants will still have the opportunity to
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, but courts will lose their
power to favor one litigant over another by subjectively selecting the
“appropriate” mode of analysis in the pleading stage. Although
personal and political biases may still influence a court’s ultimate
holding to a certain degree—particularly during the economic
analysis—at least the parties will have an opportunity to change the
court’s opinion before dismissal through oral arguments.
4. Ensuring Applicability Across
the Gamut of Vertical Restraints
Finally, applicability is another important concern in that the
standard should be universally applicable to all restraints.502 As they
exist now, the categories of analysis have become nonsensical, and

498.
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See id. at 1480.
Id. at 1456.
See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1262–63.
See id. at 1262.
Stucke, supra note 10, at 1420–21.
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they are no longer indicative of economic realities.503 Even the
Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty that courts face when
determining whether some restraints are vertical or horizontal, price
or nonprice.504 Over time, the once strict categories have become
muddled, and there is no longer a “bright line” that distinguishes
whether restraints are subject to the per se rule or the rule of
reason.505 Applicability eliminates the need to immediately
categorize restraints, thereby removing the opportunity for
miscategorization.
A rebuttable presumption will certainly achieve an improvement
in applicability, for not only will it subject all vertical restraints to
the same category of analysis, but it will also eliminate the impact of
illogical distinctions regarding what constitutes vertical and
horizontal conduct. No longer will courts have to arbitrarily
distinguish between the types of conduct at hand before delineating
their economic effects. Dual distribution and price fixing could be
evaluated by their impact on the market rather than the method used
to implement them. Applicability cannot get much simpler than this:
all vertical restraints will be considered unreasonable unless
otherwise proven. While the depth of the economic analysis may
vary based on the restraint at hand, both parties will know the test
that will be applied.
Skeptics may attempt to argue that the rebuttable presumption
will increase the cost and frequency of litigation for defendants,
which would eventually be reflected in higher prices for
consumers.506 While noteworthy, this problem could be mitigated by
a rule that required the plaintiff to pay for the defendant’s court costs
and attorney’s fees when the defendant succeeds in demonstrating
that the procompetitive benefits justify a restraint.507 Further, if a
new standard is put in place, anticompetitive practices—which often
yield higher prices—should decrease, and the impact on consumer
prices resulting from increased litigation costs and decreased
anticompetitive practices would balance each other out. In that way,
consumer prices should, at the worst, maintain the status quo.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1252.
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Studies have shown that in practice, the rule of reason operates
as a default rule of legality for vertical nonprice restraints and
maximum price fixing.508 The passage of Leegin indicates that
maximum vertical pricing will suffer a similar fate. As vertical
enforcement is rendered obsolete through the application of the rule
of reason, serious questions arise as to whether the Court has lost
sight of the original intentions of the Sherman Act. All things
considered, the rebuttable-presumption approach strikes a fair
balance between granting plaintiffs a fair opportunity to prevail
while giving defendants a chance to show that the restraint is
reasonable by proving that the procompetitive benefits outweigh the
anticompetitive effects.509
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has consistently stood by its proclamation
that the adoption of the rule of reason is consistent with the its
interpretation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act as prohibiting only
unreasonable restraints on trade.510 However, the Court’s assertion
that the rule of reason is the appropriate standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of all vertical restraints is doing a disservice to
antitrust enforcement. Weak antitrust enforcement can become a
serious concern, for businesses and consumers in particular, and
under the rule of reason, weakened vertical enforcement has become
a reality. Unfortunately, using the rule of reason to determine the
reasonableness of a restraint operationally results in per se legality.
Indeed, enforcement levels of vertical nonprice and maximum price
restraints following Sylvania and Khan confirm that a shift toward
the rule of reason has eviscerated regulation.
Lately, the Court has certainly not exercised any reasonable
restraint of its own in advancing the deregulation of competition by
extending the rule of reason. Before Leegin, the Court had only
subjected vertical nonprice and maximum price restraints to the rule
of reason and had continued to hold minimum vertical price fixing as
subject to per se illegality. However, in Leegin, the Court could no
longer resist the urge to finally subject all vertical restraints to the
508. See supra notes 167–173 and accompanying text.
509. Lao, supra note 165, at 511.
510. Hearings, supra note 392 (statement of James Wilson, Chairman, Antitrust Section of
the American Bar Association).
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rule of reason. The repercussions on vertical enforcement since
Leegin have been significant. First, the Court endorsed a heightened
pleading standard for plaintiffs by increasing the pleading burden on
plaintiffs in both Twombly and Leegin. Second, the Court’s warning
that vertical restraints continue to be subjected to the rule of reason
regardless of their horizontal impacts caused the lower courts to
become reluctant to distinguish horizontal conduct without palpable
evidence. Finally, the Court’s failure to provide enough guidance
about how to conduct an economic analysis using the rule of reason
created a standard under which it is almost impossible for plaintiffs
to win any vertical restraint cases. As a consequence, all vertical
restraints—if they are not there already—are now startlingly close to
per se legality.
Throughout the history of antitrust enforcement, the Court has
been flexible when the circumstances demand that it overturn per se
rules, but now it insists that the only alternative to per se illegality is
the rule of reason.511 The Supreme Court justices themselves have
recognized the deficiencies of the rule of reason they created, but
they choose to sit idly by, crossing their fingers and hoping that the
lower courts will somehow convert the rule of reason into a workable
standard.512 The time has come for the Court to reconsider whether
applying the rule of reason when evaluating vertical restraints is
consistent with the ultimate goals of the antitrust laws. An unbiased
reflection will reveal that it is not.
As demonstrated in this Article, the Court has become less
concerned with protecting consumer welfare and competition in
recent years, choosing to favor defendants, competitors, big
businesses, and their own political platforms instead. In effect, they
have lulled vertical enforcement to sleep. To remedy this misstep, the
Court needs to provide the lower courts with a new, more clearly
defined standard by which to evaluate reasonableness, and if the
Court is unwilling, then Congress must do so. Instituting a rebuttable
presumption of illegality promises to buttress the original aim of the
antitrust laws and reinvigorate enforcement while simultaneously
honoring the Supreme Court’s tradition of prohibiting only
unreasonable restraints.

511. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1490.
512. Id.

